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THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE GOES TO TRIAL
Elizabeth G. Thornburg *
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have spent a lot of time, and rightly so, discussing the
phenomenon of the managerial judge.1 We worry that trial court
judges have transformed themselves from people who apply law
to facts and rule on legal issues to people who manage lawsuits.
Judges use gigantic discretion during the pretrial period to shape
pleadings, schedule and limit disclosure and discovery, require
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), encourage settlement, and
otherwise sculpt the lawsuit. Equity, we fear, has run amuck in
the pretrial phase, leaving us without meaningful or consistent
limits. 2 Implicit in some of this concern is a belief that if the focus
of litigation shifted back to trial, we would be back to a rule-
driven regime where discretion is constrained and judges judge.
This article examines that belief, and concludes that the opposite
is true: discretion permeates the world of trials, the philosophy
underlying managerial judging has expanded into the trial
* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law.
I would like to thank Anthony Colangelo, Mary Spector, and Lonny Hoffman for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also am grateful to the Barbara and
Michael Lynn Faculty Research Fund for the summer grant that supported this research.
1. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial
Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41 (1995); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 975-91 (1987).
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phase,3 and trial-phase managerial decisions are just as resistant
to appellate review as pretrial ones.
The procedural rules that govern the actual trial do almost
nothing to guide or constrain judicial discretion. There are rules
about juries, evidence, and jury instructions, but in substance
and application most are almost wholly discretionary. Boiled
down to the mandatory elements, the rules require that if a jury
is requested in a timely manner, there will be a jury of six to
twelve people who must reach a unanimous decision.4 There will
be some kind of evidence, 5 mostly in open court.6 If there is a jury,
the judge will give it some kind of charge, requesting some kind
of verdict. 7 The parties must be treated in a way that is not facial-
ly unequal.8 But that is about it.
There is so much discretion in the federal rules that beyond
these extremely basic limits, a judge can take a wide range of ac-
tions without being reversed. From the immediate pretrial period
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2), (e); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CIVIL
LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 77-90 (2001) [hereinafter CLMM], available at http:/I
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/civlitig0l.pdf/$file/civlitig0l.pdf; Richard L. Marcus,
Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 744 (1989) ("The second and more interesting
aspect of case management is the impact it has had on the conduct of the trial itself.").
Rule 16 was amended in 1993 to authorize and facilitate the migration of management
into the trial itself. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1993 amend.). As the Advisory Committee noted,
The primary purposes of the changes in subdivision (c) are to call attention to
the opportunities for structuring of trial under Rules 42, 50, and 52 and to
eliminate questions that have occasionally been raised regarding the authori-
ty of the court to make appropriate orders designed either to facilitate set-
tlement or to provide for an efficient and economical trial. The prefatory lan-
guage of this subdivision is revised to clarify the court's power to enter
appropriate orders at a conference notwithstanding the objection of a party.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1993 amend.).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIv. P. 38 (stating timing of jury demand); FED.
R. CIV. P. 48 (stating number and unanimity requirements).
5. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 736 ("[U]nder the Federal Rules it seems to have
been assumed that the mode of trial ... would include opening statements, live testimony
of witnesses, and closing arguments."). For a discussion of the discretion inherent in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, see generally Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOwA L. REV. 413 (1989), and Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Dis-
cretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1097 (1985).
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43 (stating rules for taking testimony).
7. See FED. R. CIv. P. 49 (stating procedures for jury verdicts).
8. See Alston v. West, 340 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1965) (noting that in the context of
time limits placed on counsel's arguments, a trial judge must "treat[ ] both sides substan-
tially alike" and "not give one side a preference or advantage over the other").
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through the charge to the jury, the court may schedule the trial;'
shape and order the proceedings; ° construct a trial plan;" influ-
ence the selection of the jury;12 contract or expand the scope of
admissible evidence and control its format;13 and limit the time
for trial in various ways. 4 The judge also enjoys enormous leeway
over the end of the process, including the length and timing of
closing argument, 15 the format of the charge to the jury, 6 the for-
mat of the jury's verdict,'7 and the power to grant a mistrial or
new trial.' s With very few exceptions, these decisions are go-
verned by rules with little inherent content, and those rules can
be deployed in the service of judicial management.
The benefit of such extensive discretion is the power to perfect-
ly tailor the structure of the trial to the needs of a particular case.
Ideally, both before and during trial, managerial judges will use
their intelligence in light of their experience to rule wisely and
well. 9 But managerial judging is not an absolute good and its
downside can be significant. The managerial side of these rules
requires a balance of perceived importance and probable cost. A
judge with a conscious or unconscious bias can string together a
9. FED. R. CIv. P. 40 ("Each court must provide by rule for scheduling trials."). The
discretion continues in the grant or denial of continuances. 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE J 40.02[5] (3d ed. 2009) ("A district court's ruling on a motion
for continuance will not ordinarily be disturbed . . . ."); see also Martel v. County of Los
Angeles, 56 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that "[e]ven if the district court had
abused its discretion, such an error is not reversible absent the clearest showing of actual
and substantial prejudice").
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (governing pretrial conferences and scheduling); FED.
R. CIv. P. 42 (governing consolidation and separate trials); FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (governing
judges' ability to grant motions for judgment as a matter of law); FED. R. CIV. P. 52 (go-
verning findings and conclusions by court).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(e).
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 47; see also text accompanying supra note 4.
13. Marcus, supra note 3, at 744-45; Mengler, supra note 5, at 414-15; see, e.g., Sa-
verson v. Levitt, 162 F.R.D. 407, 407, 410 (D.D.C. 1995).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2). Among other things, the judge may "order[ ] the presenta-
tion of evidence early in the trial on a[n] issue that might ... be the basis for judgment as
a matter of law" and "establish[ ] a reasonable limit on the time allowed to present evi-
dence." FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(2)(N)-(O).
15. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 51.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
18. FED. R. CIv. P. 59.
19. Cf. 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, 1 16.03 (explaining the federal rules' contempla-
tion of judges' "dynamic, active inducement in the pretrial process" in order to ensure
"fairness and [ I] efficiency [at] all stages of civil litigation"). Moore's chapter on case man-
agement under Rule 16 was written by influential U.S. Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Bra-
zil. Id.
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set of procedural rulings that makes it much more difficult to
prove or defend certain cases or types of cases. That judge can al-
so cause dramatic shifts in settlement leverage through mana-
gerial orders. Even a judge aiming only at efficiency can "man-
age" in a way that leads to a result that is less reliable in its
finding of facts or its application of law to fact.2° Any significant
effects on trials can have important consequences, since the few
cases that actually go to trial form a body of outcomes that shape
everything from settlement values to the development of
precedent."1
As Judge Patrick Higginbotham, one-time Chair of the Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, empha-
sized,
We need trials, and a steady stream of them, to ground our norma-
tive standards-to make them sufficiently clear that persons can ab-
ide by them in planning their affairs-and never face the court-
house-the ultimate settlement. Trials reduce disputes, and it is a
profound mistake to view a trial as a failure of the system. A well
conducted trial is its crowning achievement.22
Yet an over-managed trial may prevent that trial from serving its
normative and educational function.
Actual trials of civil cases are increasingly rare. As Marc Ga-
lanter observed,
In 1962, there were 5,802 civil trials in the federal district courts,
making up 11.5 percent of all terminations. In 2004, when there
were five times as many cases filed, there were only 3,951 trials,
making up 1.7 percent of terminations.
Over this forty-two year period the total number of civil cases
terminated rose 400 percent while the number of trials fell 32 per-
cent.
2
-
This might make the issue of managerial trials seem insignifi-
cant-it affects only a handful of cases. However, such a conclu-
sion understates the impact of trial management in at least two
20. Cf Marcus, supra note 3, at 767-69 (discussing judges' use of the procedural tech-
nique of trial subdivision and its potential effect on the legal merits of trials).
21. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1,
26-27 (2004).
22. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyo-
la University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV.
1405, 1423 (2002).
23. Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DiSP. RESOL. 7, 7-8 (2006) (foot-
notes omitted).
1264 [Vol. 44:1261
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ways. First, orders entered in the immediate pretrial period that
structure the trial are designed, in part, to create settlement
pressure, and the tactic often works. 24 In that sense, the "man-
agement" of trials exacerbates the "vanishing trial" phenomenon.
Second, the small number of trials makes the quality and trans-
parency of those that remain extremely important. Cases that
settle do so "in the shadow of the law," and so the outcomes of
cases that are tried influence the results of a larger number of
cases that are not.25 If judicial management increases settlements
and skews outcomes, it affects both the strength of the signal and
the message it sends.26
This article explores the ways in which the managerial focus of
judges, born in the pretrial stage, has expanded into the actual
trial of cases. Part II introduces the theory of the managerial
judge and its application to the pretrial phase of litigation. It
identifies the motivations behind judicial management as well as
the management movement's underlying assumptions about the
comparative roles of judges and lawyers. This section also out-
lines the scholarly critique of judicial management.
Part III examines the role that discretion plays at the trial
phase of litigation. It contends that any nostalgic vision of the
trial as the place where judges play a constrained and passive
role bears little resemblance to the work of the modern federal
trial judge. Instead, the same forces that cause judges to seek ef-
ficiency and settlement before trial also cause them to "manage"
the actual trial in search of time savings and settled outcomes.
This should not be surprising-the judge who exercises detailed
hands-on management of a case before trial is unlikely to revert
to a wallflower if the case goes to trial-yet the mechanisms and
effect of this trial management have not previously been ex-
plored.
24. See Rex K. Linder, What Are the New Rules?, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 186, 191 (1994)
(explaining that the court has the power to enter orders designed to "facilitate settle-
ment").
25. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a Sys-
tem Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (noting, however, that since the
cases that are tried are not typical, this reliance may be misplaced); see also Marc Galan-
ter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1349 (1994) (explaining the relationship between cases tried and
cases settled, while noting that the relationship does not imply either method has a great-
er value as a means of adjudication).
26. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 25, at 1349 ("In a forum where most cases settle,
legal signals may lose clarity.").
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Part IV considers whether the scholarly critique of pretrial
management also applies to management in the trial phase.
While the trial process is more transparent and immediately ap-
pealable than pretrial decisions, this article argues that trial
management is just as ad hoc, just as affected by individual
judges' experience and biases, and just as able to grant strategic
advantages and disadvantages as its pretrial counterpart. In ad-
dition, trial-stage management can interfere with another
process value not implicated in pretrial management: the limited,
truncated trial created by the managerial orders disrupts the
process value of litigation to the parties, the importance of which
is well documented in the empirical literature.27 Further, recent
empirical research indicating that subtle biases find their way in-
to judicial decision-making, coupled with the politicization of the
judicial selection process, make the existence of discretion un-
guided by standards more worrisome.
Nor does appeal add meaningful regulation that could guide
trial judges in their use of managerial techniques. The abuse of
discretion standard of review, coupled with the harmless error
rule, protect trial-stage management from reversal. The rules
themselves do not provide a framework for evaluating trial
judges' managerial orders, and the deferential standard of review
renders the rules almost vacuous in all but the most egregious
cases.
Part V compares pretrial and trial management in terms of
their susceptibility to reform. Although in some ways trial man-
agement could be guided with less disruption than pretrial man-
agement, this article concludes that the adoption of such meas-
ures is politically unlikely. In the end, for both pretrial and trial
managerial activities, the judiciary's own internal standards will
remain the most powerful arbiter of management decisions.
This article concludes by looking at the big picture-what im-
pact do managerial orders have on distributive and procedural
justice? It argues that management's myopic focus on speed, in-
herent lack of standards, inconsistent application, and marked
ability to skew the merits threaten important procedural values.
While efficiency is important, it is only one piece of the due
process calculus. As Rule 1 reminds us, the system should be ad-
27. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 1-6 (1988).
[Vol. 44:12611266
THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE GOES TO TRIAL
ministered to secure the "just" administration of disputes.2 1 Con-
sistency, transparency, party participation, and unbiased decision
makers are key elements of a just system, and all can be under-
mined by extensive judicial management. Uncritical enthusiasm
for managerial judging needs to be replaced with a more meas-
ured and thoughtful approach, so that the competing needs of the
court system can return to balance.
II. THE THEORY OF MANAGERIAL JUDGING
The phrase "managerial judges" was coined by Judith Resnik
in her classic 1982 article,29 and her terminology has become a
standard part of civil procedure vocabulary. She uses it to de-
scribe a judge's hands-on supervision of cases from the outset, us-
ing various procedural tools to speed the process of dispute reso-
lution and encourage settlement. Resnik described the evolution
of managerial judging like this:
As work load pressures grew, reformers in the 1960's and 1970's
shifted their attention from procedural to administrative problems.
Social scientists and popular writers, investigating trial courts for
the first time, described growing backlogs of pending cases and
"lazy" judges devoting little time to their work. Commentators,
alarmed by delays and the absence of judicial accountability, proc-
laimed a "crisis in the courts."
Many saw systems management as the solution. Federal judges
met to design procedures for case allocation and to analyze methods
of expediting case disposition. Congress created the Federal Judicial
Center, which began to train newly appointed trial judges in tech-
niques of docket management. ... [Slome district courts promulgat-
ed local rules that obliged litigants to submit pretrial plans, to con-
form to judicial timetables for trial preparation, and to seek
permission to engage in extensive discovery.2
The business of managerial judging is accomplished not by apply-
ing the law, but by using the judge's own beliefs about the tech-
niques best suited to lead a case to a quick and efficient end.
While it began as a way to handle the "protracted case," pretrial
management expanded to become the norm for ordinary cases.3 '
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[These rules] should be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.").
29. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J.
371, 371-72 & n.4 (2001) (citing Resnik, supra note 1).
30. Resnik, supra note 1, at 397-99 (footnotes omitted).
31. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GROUP ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIGATION,
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Since the 1980s, amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ("Rule 16") have not only blessed judicial man-
agement, but also made judicial management a requirement in
almost every case. The Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1983
amendments proclaim that
[e]mpirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes perso-
nally at an early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to
schedule dates for completion by the parties of the principal pretrial
steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently
and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their
own devices.
32
The 1993 amendments made explicit the court's power to use
"various procedures that, in addition to traditional settlement
conferences, may be helpful in settling litigation."33 Settlement is
preferred to adjudication both because it is faster and because of
the belief that a consensual outcome is preferable to a litigated
one. 4
With efficiency as the system's predominant value, other as-
sumptions follow. First, as Resnik notes, the quantity of judicial
activity-which is measured-becomes more important than the
quality of that activity, a much more slippery concept.3 5 Second,
perhaps to reassure us about quality, pro-management writers
question whether more process even leads to better outcomes.36
Or, in a less drastic version, they argue that neither the litigants
nor society can afford to provide full procedural treatment of
every dispute.', Third, underlying all of this is the assumption
HANDBOOK FOR PROTRACTED CASES, 25 F.R.D. 351, 359 (1960) ("Let it be emphasized this
is not the ordinary litigation; our subject is rare in number, the truly complicated, a few
hundred amid the tens of thousands of cases on federal court calendars."); Judith Resnik,
Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil
Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 167 (1997).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983 amend.) (citing STEVEN
FLANDERS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 17 (1977)). Resnik questioned the conclusion of Flanders
and other management proponents. Resnik, supra note 1, at 416-24. Flanders wrote a spi-
rited response to Managerial Judges. See Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to
Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1993 amend.).
34. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494, 537-38 (1986).
35. Resnik, supra note 1, at 421-22.
36. Cf. Elliott, supra note 1, at 319-20 (discussing managerial judging proponents'
view that discovery sanctions added in 1983 "impos[ed] an additional layer of procedural
resources that c[ould] be used by lawyers [merely] for tactical purposes").
37. See Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process,
1268 [Vol. 44:1261
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that the lawyers cannot be trusted to efficiently manage their
own cases.38 A combination of self-interest (hourly billing), risk
aversion (limited discovery might miss key evidence), strategic
actions (promoting better settlement by increasing the opponent's
cost), and actual benefit from delay (for the party who profits
from the status quo or loss of evidence) is said to lead lawyers to
over-work and delay cases in their own and their clients' inter-
ests. 39 Only the judge, if one buys this argument, is in a position
to make decisions in the interest of the lawyers' clients, taxpay-
ers, and the other users of the court system. 0 Thus, through im-
position of costs or actual numerical limits, managerial judges act
to restrict the lawyer's options from the full menu of possibilities
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; they put litiga-
tion on a diet.
Academics questioned pretrial managerial judging both empir-
ically and normatively.41 The normative critique is the focus of
this article. Resnik and others argued that managerial judging
not only lacks a basis in rules but also is not even guided by
94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1644 (1985); see also Elliott, supra note 1, at 321 ("Nourishing the fic-
tion that justice is a pearl beyond price has its own price." (footnote omitted)). Resnik
summarizes the critics' attitude:
If outcomes after trial or other forms of adjudication cannot, systematically
and in the aggregate, be demonstrated (or at least felt) to be better than out-
comes produced with little or no process, if attorney misbehavior and incom-
petence are widespread, if the adversarial model is applied in settings which
render it farcical, why insist upon formal procedure?
Resnik, supra note 34, at 529.
38. Rhetorically, the focus on criticizing lawyers rather than clients is a shrewd move.
Greedy, ineffective, or expensive lawyers are culturally an easy target. See STEPHEN
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 38-39 (1995);
MARC S. GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 3-5 (2005).
However, it is ultimately the client's autonomy that is threatened when the judge, rather
than the lawyer or client's agent, takes control.
39. See generally Melvin M. Belli, The Law's Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in
Civil Litigation, 8 J. LEGIS. 16 (1981) (discussing the causes and possible solutions of de-
lays in trial procedure).
40. Elliott, supra note 1, at 309 ("Managerial judges believe that the system does not
work; that something must be done to make it work; and that the only plausible solution
to the problem is ad hoc procedural activism by judges.").
41. See, for example, the RAND evaluation of the impact of the Civil Justice Reform
Act's required management techniques. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT (1996) (finding that early case management was associated with shorter time
to disposition and significantly increased attorney work hours and that setting an early
trial date-by shortening the time to cutoff of discovery-was the only management tool
that had a statistically significant decrease on both time to disposition, and cost of litiga-
tion, lawyer satisfaction, or perception of fairness).
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standards;42 that it is ad hoc and thus varies from case to case;43
that it is often done out of the public view and results in sealed
private settlements, making it doubly nontransparent;14 that it
involves judges more directly in interactions with the parties and
reveals party strategy in ways that threaten judicial impartiali-
ty;45 and that a combination of a deferential standard of review,
the harmless error rule, and the final judgment rule make it ef-
fectively unreviewable.46 Worse, managerial decisions have the
ability to affect the outcome of litigation, yet vary depending on
the identity and attitudes of the individual judge.47
One experiment dramatically demonstrated the very different
choices that judges might make in the same case-disturbing but
not surprising in a context where decisions are ad hoc and the
standard is efficiency. At a conference at Yale Law School in
1985, participating judges were presented with a hypothetical
case in which thousands of named plaintiffs, all of whom resided
within two miles of a hazardous waste disposal site, sued 152
corporate defendants after an EPA study revealed "the presence
of high concentrations of pollutants, including several 'probabl[e]
human carcinogens."'' 4 Judges' reactions to this case ranged from
a judge who recommended establishing a $60 million settlement
fund (designed to "curb litigation energy" up front) to a judge
who, because she believed the case lacked merit, recommended
forcing each individual plaintiff to file a separate complaint,
pleading his or her claim with particularity, or to face dismissal.49
This judge noted that she would "use procedural tools at her dis-
posal to stall the litigation in order to promote settlements."50 As
42. Resnik, supra note 34, at 548 ("I am deeply skeptical of the capacity of individual
judges to craft rules on a case-by-case basis.").
43. Elliott, supra note 1, at 316-17.
44. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dord, Secrecy By Consent: The Use and Limits of Confi-
dentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 290, 300 (1999); Ri-
chard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt
You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUD. OF LEGAL ETHIcS 115, 117-22 (1999). Compare Arthur R. Mil-
ler, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV.
427, 501-02 (1991), with David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned
Secrecy and the Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE L.J. 807, 808 (2003).
45. Resnik, supra note 1, at 426-27.
46. Peterson, supra note 1, at 77.
47. See Elliott, supra note 1, at 314-15; Resnik, supra note 1, at 426.
48. Deborah Graham, ADR Conference Airs Hopes-and Some Doubts, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1985, at A2.
49. Id.
50. Id.
1270 [Vol. 44:1261
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Yale professor E. Donald Elliott, the organizer of the conference,
noted,
[Alt least when judges make legal decisions, the parties have an op-
portunity to marshal arguments based on an established body of
principles, judges are required to state reasons to justify their deci-
sions, and appellate review is available. None of these safeguards is
available when judges make managerial decisions.
It seems beyond serious debate, then, that discretionary mana-
gerial decisions may influence the outcome of litigation in ways that
are arbitrary because judges act without the procedural safeguards
that accompany decisions on the merits.5
The Federal Courts Study Committee agreed: "Each judge is free
to consult his or her own conception of the importance and merit
of a case and the proper speed with which it should be disposed."52
Each judge is also free to craft whatever combination of mana-
gerial techniques appeal to the judge. "The huge range of practic-
es under Rule 16 among sitting federal judges is one of the more
unnerving facts of litigation life that confronts the contemporary
lawyer."53 Judges are fully aware of the extent of their discretion.
For example, the federal court system's Civil Litigation Manage-
ment Manual ("CLMM") finds authority for management, among
other places, in Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
the harmless error rule.54 Management advocates, then, are very
aware that they are operating in ways that the rules may not
sanction but that are effectively protected from control by appel-
late courts.
III. MANAGERIAL JUDGING AT TRIAL
A. Introducing the Model
In Managerial Judges, Resnik constructed two hypothetical
cases to illustrate the implementation of pretrial and post-trial
management. 55 This section of the article will take Resnik's pre-
trial example, "Paulson v. Danforth, Ltd.," 56 update it, and con-
51. Elliott, supra note 1, at 317.
52. I JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMM. 55 (1990) (noting, inter alia, that judges do not need to supply a "reasoned justifi-
cation"). Volume I of the report is reprinted at 22 CONN. L. REV. 733 (1990).
53. 3 MOORE ET AL.,supra note 9, 1 16.04[1] [a].
54. CLMM, supra note 3, at 1.
55. Resnik, supra note 1, at 386-90.
56. Id. at 388-90.
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sider how the judge's management might continue into the trial
phase of the case. The next section will discuss the rules and case
law that provide the judge with authority to manage the case in
the ways described.
On July 1, 2008, Sarah Paulson bought a "Nano," a small fuel-
efficient car manufactured by Prem Kumar Motors, an Indian
company. She bought it from Kumar's dealership in the state of
Essex. When driving it at the speed limit on an interstate high-
way on January 23, 2009, she was rear-ended by another vehicle.
The gas tank exploded immediately, and Paulson was badly
burned. Her lawyer, Danny Boyle, filed Paulson v. Kumar Motors
in the United States District Court for the District of Essex.
Paulson alleged that Kumar was guilty of negligence and gross
negligence in the design of the Nano, that the Nano was defec-
tively designed, and that Kumar failed to warn purchasers about
the car's dangerous gas tank design. Paulson sought actual dam-
ages of $750,000 and punitive damages of $1.5 million. Kumar
answered, denying liability and also alleging that any defects in
the car were not the cause of Paulson's damages.
After holding an initial pretrial conference, entering a schedul-
ing order, referring the case to mediation, and trying repeatedly
but unsuccessfully to convince the parties to settle, Judge Kinser
summoned the parties for a final pretrial conference. At the con-
ference Judge Kinser sustained most of Kumar's objections to dis-
covery, finding that the need for the information was outweighed
by the expense of production and the commercial sensitivity of
the information. After he disposed of the pending motions, Judge
Kinser once again held separate conferences with each side in an
effort to convince them to settle the case.
When settlement efforts did not succeed, Judge Kinser an-
nounced that he had decided to consolidate Paulson's case with
five other similar cases against Kumar pending in his court (all of
the plaintiffs are Essex citizens) and, further, that he intended to
bifurcate the proceedings. In Phase I, the parties will present
evidence on the issues of causation; Phase II will try fault (includ-
ing contributory fault). If the jury findings in the first two phases
do not preclude recovery, all eligible plaintiffs will go on to Phase
III in which their individual damages will be determined. Finally,
in Phase IV, if the jury finds gross negligence in Phase II, the
jury will hear further evidence and find an appropriate amount
for punitive damages, if any. Because Judge Kinser expects each
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phase to move quickly, the same jury will hear all phases of the
case, thus removing any potential Seventh Amendment problems.
At the end of each phase, the jury will be asked to make findings
using a special verdict, in which each component of each issue is
decided separately. Although no jury demand was filed in a time-
ly way under Rule 38's guidelines,5 7 Judge Kinser has decided to
allow the late-filed request and will submit all appropriate issues
to the jury.
Judge Kinser scheduled Phase I to begin in three weeks. He al-
so ordered counsel for all parties to confer and to submit no later
than a week before trial an agreed pretrial memorandum and
proposed order. The submission was required to include (1) a list
of uncontested facts; (2) a list of contested facts; (3) a list of all
witnesses (with a summary of anticipated testimony and antic-
ipated time required for direct and cross-examination); (4) a list
of all testimony to be presented by deposition, together with the
actual text or video to be submitted; (5) a copy of all exhibits to be
offered by each party (pre-marked for trial); (6) any objections
(other than relevance) to any other party's exhibits, failing which
the objections will be waived; (7) all motions in limine and ac-
companying briefs; (8) briefing on any unusual anticipated trial
issues; (9) estimated time required for each phase of the trial; and
(10) proposed jury instructions for each phase, preferably agreed
but otherwise one from each litigant, annotated with supporting
authorities.
When Judge Kinser received the parties' requested pretrial or-
der, he convened a telephone conference. Judge Kinser considered
the parties' estimate for the trial of Phase I, and informed them
that based on his knowledge of the case, he believed that it could
be completed in half of the requested time. He himself would do
the voir dire questioning of the jury (the parties may request sub-
jects for questioning), and each side would receive three peremp-
tory strikes (with plaintiffs to exercise theirs jointly). He would
also present an opening summary of the issues in the case in lieu
of party opening statements (which he directed the parties to
jointly prepare for him). Judge Kinser informed the parties that
he would not allow any questions about the impact of publicity
about a "litigation crisis" or "runaway juries" on the jury panel's
attitudes about lawsuits. All direct testimony would be presented
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
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in a narrative in writing and read to the jury, with only cross-
and re-direct examination done live. Any deposition testimony to
be presented would be by summary rather than by question and
answer. Each side would be limited to one expert witness per top-
ic. Sidebar conferences would be allowed only when absolutely es-
sential, and offers of proof, if needed, would be made by narrative
statement after the close of all the evidence. Closing argument
would be limited to ten minutes per side. At the end of each day's
testimony, each party would produce a lawyer and a client with
settlement authority to participate in settlement discussions led
by Judge Kinser.58 The judge went on to impose limits on the
number of witnesses, number of exhibits, and total trial time for
each phase (a "shot clock" will measure each party's use of time,
and time for evidentiary objections will be counted against the
loser), although he assured the parties that he may allow more
time if developments showed it to be essential.
OR-maybe pretrial events went this way: Judge Kinser
granted the plaintiffs' discovery requests, ordered compliance in
one week, and set the trial for a month from the date of the pre-
trial conference. Looking ahead to the trial, Judge Kinser ordered
that Phase I would consider the amount of each plaintiffs actual
damages, Kumar's liability for punitive damages, and the multip-
lier to be used to calculate punitive damages. Phase II would try
defendant's fault for negligence and product liability, Phase III
would try plaintiffs contributory fault, and Phase IV would try
causation. Each phase (unless its results would negate plaintiffs'
ability to recover) would be followed by short, but intense, settle-
ment talks. Otherwise, however, Judge Kinser did not impose ad-
vance limits on the nature or quality of evidence or the time for
trial, and indicated that each phase would utilize the broadest
form of jury charge feasible for the issues being tried.
OR-maybe pretrial events happened like this: Judge Kinser,
who is not a fan of managerial judging, neither consolidated nor
bifurcated the trial. He set a firm trial date for Paulson's case two
weeks from the conference, assuring the parties that no conti-
nuance would be granted. Other than that, he left trial planning
and settlement discussions to the parties and their lawyers.
58. The CLMM encourages judges to suggest settlement discussions during trial.
"Raising the issue at that time may help the parties gracefully cut their losses." CLMM,
supra note 3, at 59.
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What gives Judge Kinser the right to enter (or not enter) this
wide array of orders? The answer is the federal rules' inherent
flexibility, the specific management provisions of Rule 16, and a
good deal of encouragement from the federal judicial establish-
ment. The trial of a federal civil lawsuit is shot full of discretion.
This discretion predates the serious advent of managerial judg-
ing, and it puts the real power over procedural decisions firmly in
the hands of the trial courts. When judges became more worried
about efficiently disposing of their dockets, those who were so in-
clined adapted the existing power to allow the kind of intense in-
volvement in trials that they had come to expect in pretrial mat-
ters.
B. The Many Layers of Discretion
1. Shaping the Trial
A judge's decisions about how to structure the trial of a case
come into focus in the period immediately preceding trial. Some
of these decisions must take substantive law into account, at
least indirectly. Others are more purely administrative in nature.
But these decisions are made in a context in which neither the
rules nor the case law provides much in the way of governing
standards against which the judge's exercise of discretion can be
measured.
Some of the most managerial forms of discretion to be used in
shaping the trial are enabled by Rule 16 .59 For example, Rule 16
authorizes the judge to set a trial date;6° rule in advance on the
admissibility of evidence;61 avoid "unnecessary" proof and "cumu-
lative" evidence; 2 limit the use of expert testimony;63 order a sep-
arate trial of particular claims or issues;6 order the presentation
at the beginning of trial of evidence on a potentially dispositive
59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16. These options for shaping the trial dovetail nicely with
Rule 26(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires pretrial disclosure of
witnesses and exhibits (except for rebuttal evidence) and pretrial objections to the exhibits
on all bases other than relevance and bases for exclusion under Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3); FED. R. EVID. 403.
60. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(2)(G).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(C).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(D).
63. Id.
64. FED. R. CIrv. P. 16(c)(2)(M)
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issue;65 establish a "reasonable" limit on the amount of time to
present evidence;66 and formulate a trial plan.6 7
In deciding whether to separate or join issues for trial, the
court can combine its Rule 16 management powers with the dis-
cretion given by other procedure rules to sever claims, order sep-
arate trials, and consolidate claims.68 The court may also schedule
a unitary trial, but make decisions that govern the order in which
information will be presented to the jury.6 9
These final pretrial orders have managerial goals in two
senses: they aim to encourage settlement and, if the case does not
settle, to limit issues and shorten the trial itself. The burden of
complying with standard pretrial disclosure requirements sub-
stantially frontloads the cost of trial preparation and may itself
encourage settlement. "Counsel, to relieve themselves of the bur-
den of furnishing this information, settle many of the[ir] cas-
es .. .-17o In addition, final pretrial orders can limit the number of
witnesses, number of exhibits, number of experts, use of live tes-
timony, and total trial time for each party.7 1
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(N).
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(D).
67. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(e). A trial plan may be quite specific, including the precise order
of proceeding, time limits for each witness, pre-prepared summaries, pre-admitted exhi-
bits, jury instructions, and more:
A detailed trial plan might specify the following matters: The juncture at
which the opening statements will be made (a defendant may elect to give
some or all of its opening statement after the plaintiff has presented its case
in chief) and how much time will be allotted for the opening statements[; t]he
order in which each witness will testify (except those called solely for im-
peachment or rebuttal) or each excerpt from a deposition transcript will be
read, and the time allotted for each direct and cross-examination[; t]he se-
quence in which the documentary and other exhibits will be introduced, and
which witnesses will sponsor which exhibits[; w]hen any demonstrations will
be performed or site visits made[; tihe junctures, if any, at which interim
summarizations or arguments may be presented by counsel[; t]he order in
which closing arguments will be presented and the time allotted for each.
3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, T1 16.77[41 [h].
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 42. For further discussion of the ways in which the consoli-
dation and bifurcation rules can be used to dramatically shape trials, see infra notes 182-
87 and accompanying text
69. The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly provide that "[t]he court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evi-
dence so as to ... make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment
of truth...." FED. R. EvID. 61i(a).
70. Gus J. Solomon, Address Before the Ninth Judicial District Conference: Tech-
niques for Shortening Trials (Aug. 2, 1974), in 65 F.R.D. 485, 488 (1975).
71. See infra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
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2. Jury Issues
Absent settlement, the day for trial will arrive. If a party has
made a timely request for a jury under Rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 38"), a jury must decide all issues
for which the Seventh Amendment requires a jury.72 A judge has
no discretion there. However, if a party files a belated jury re-
quest, Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 39")
grants the judge discretion to grant or deny that request. 3 Rules
giving judges discretion to save litigants from their own errors
are not unusual. Nor is it unusual that this discretion is likely to
be exercised with managerial goals in mind. Although traditional-
ly the discretion was exercised in favor of allowing a jury,74 more
recent cases see denying a jury trial as a way to save time:
In what appears to be an ever-increasing number of federal courts
.... it has been held that the district court has no discretion to
grant a jury trial when there was no timely demand unless there are
special circumstances excusing the oversight or default or, as articu-
lated by some courts, unless there are highly exceptional circums-
tances, or there is a showing of prejudice.... Occasionally a court
will articulate what is probably in the minds of many district judges
as they deny Rule 39(b) motions-that the court's docket is over-
crowded and it typically takes longer to try a case to a jury.75
If there will be a jury, the judge has discretion to use anywhere
from six to twelve jurors.7 6 Some districts expressly provide for a
specific number of jurors in their local rules (although that num-
ber varies), while others provide a range, and others (like Rule 48
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) leave the choice entirely
to the discretion of the trial judge. 7 Despite the existence of con-
siderable evidence that the size of a jury makes a difference in
72. FED. R. CrV. P. 38; see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) ("The
Court has construed [the Seventh Amendment] to require a jury trial on the merits in
those actions that are analogous to Suits at common law." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b).
74. See, e.g., Swofford v. B&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1964) (stating that a
jury trial should be granted absent "strong and compelling reasons to the contrary").
75. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2334 (3d ed. 2008) (footnotes omitted); see also BCCI Holdings v. Khalil, 182
F.R.D. 335, 336, 339 (D.D.C. 1998) (refusing to grant late jury request in interests of other
cases that would be delayed by longer jury trial).
76. FED. R. CIv. P. 48; see also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (rejecting
challenges to local rule providing for jury of six).
77. 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, § 2491 (citing various district court local
rules).
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the quality and nature of jury deliberations,'8 it appears that ap-
pellate courts have repeatedly rejected the arguments of litigants
seeking reversal based on the number of jurors chosen, so long as
the number is between six and twelve and is consistent with the
local rules.7 9 A 1995 proposal to remove judges' discretion and re-
quire twelve-member juries in all federal civil trials was defeated
based on opposition from the trial judges who wanted to retain
the discretion to choose a lower number. 80
The trial judge also has tremendous discretion in shaping the
selection process. For voir dire, the judge has discretion as to the
form and content of questions,81 and as to who will actually con-
duct the questioning.82 "Ordinarily,... the appellate court will
decline to find error regardless of what questions the trial court
allowed to be asked of the prospective jurors."83 In ruling on chal-
lenges for cause, the court's discretion is also expansive, as case
law provides few limits. The court of appeals has not provided
guidance, adopting a standard of review that is "deferential, but
not completely supine."8
78. Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in
Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1993); Developments in the Law-The Civil
Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1468-88 (1997).
79. See Resnik, supra note 31, at 143, n.27. In fact, trial court judges have been af-
firmed despite deviating from the number prescribed in local rules. Id.
80. Resnik, supra note 31, at 146 n.33 (citing Bruce D. Brown, Judges Kill Plan to Re-
quire 12 on Jury, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at 12; Henry J. Reske, Downward Trends:
The Verdict of Most States and the Judicial Conference is ... Smaller Juries Are More Ef-
ficient, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 24).
81. Smith v. Tenet Healthsystem SL, Inc., 436 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2006) ("District
courts have broad discretion to determine the scope of voir dire."). The CLMM lists
streamlining voir dire procedures as a management technique. CLMM, supra note 3, at
86-87.
82. See 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, § 2482. As with the number of jurors,
district judges successfully opposed a rule amendment that would have given attorneys
the right to participate in voir dire questioning. Resnik, supra note 31, at 149 n.42. Judges
generally believe that court-conducted voir dire saves time: as long ago as 1975, one judge
estimated that he could seat a jury in no more than twenty minutes. Solomon, supra note
70, at 492.
83. 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, § 2482.
84. Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 624-25 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.)
(citations omitted); cf. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984) (in a habeas corpus
case, holding that the trial court's determination of impartiality is a question of credibility
and demeanor and entitled to "special deference"). In some circuits, even a decision that
the trial court abused its discretion will not lead to reversal if the complaining party was
able to use a peremptory challenge to eliminate the undesirable juror, on the theory that
the error was harmless. See, e.g., Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 66 F.3d 1119, 1122-23
(10th Cir. 1995). But see Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 151, 170 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that a "per se reversal" was required because the trial judge's refusal to remove
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Treatment of peremptory challenges provides for additional
leeway. Although the United States Code provides three peremp-
tories per side, the trial judge has great discretion to change the
number and allocation in an effort to achieve a fair balance when
there are multiple parties.- Furthermore, there is almost no limit
on the method the court chooses for the parties to exercise their
peremptory strikes.6
3. Presenting Evidence
Surely a huge majority of civil cases begin the evidence phase
by allowing counsel to make opening statements, with the plain-
tiff going first. Nevertheless, it appears that federal judges have
the discretion to eliminate opening statements, to limit their
length, and to determine their order and timing.87 There is simi-
larly wide discretion as to the order of proceedings," and, as
noted above, judges are now encouraged to identify severable
claims or issues that might eliminate the need to try the rest of
the case, or that might promote settlement, and hear those issues
first.
8 9
The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves allow wide discre-
tion in a number of ways. Some questions, such as the materiality
inquiry in a relevance issue, are largely guided by substantive
law;90 the elements of the claims and defenses will determine
what information is logically relevant in the sense that it has
two jurors challenged for causes forced the defendant to waste two peremptory strikes).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73
F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996);
Smith v. Pressed Steel Tank Co., 66 F.R.D. 429, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1975). A disproportionate
allocation of peremptory strikes, however, can lead to reversal. See Goldstein v. Kelleher,
728 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1984).
86. 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, § 2483.
87. See United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that even
in criminal cases, "both the granting and timing of opening statements are matters within
the discretion of the trial judge"); Clark Adver. Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 490 F.2d 834, 836-37
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. 5 Cases, 179 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1950); see also Cham-
bers Practices of Magistrate Judge Joan G. Margolis, http://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/ practi-
ceof jgm.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) ("Magistrate Judge Margolis generally does not
allow opening statements .... She would [rather] read a neutral statement about the
case, prepared jointly by counsel.").
88. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 42.
89. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2); supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Charles W. Collier & Christopher Slobogin, Terms of Endearment and
Articles of Impeachment, 51 FLA. L. REV. 615, 624 ("It is an axiom of evidence law that ma-
teriality depends upon the legal doctrine at issue.").
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"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.""l However, that
is not the only determinant of admissibility. Relevant evidence
may be excluded if, among other things, the judge thinks that the
probative value of the evidence will be substantially outweighed
by considerations of "undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." 92 Similarly, Federal Rule of
Evidence 611(a) empowers judges to "exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and pre-
senting evidence so as to... avoid needless consumption of
time .... -13 Managerial decisions, then, are again a component of
the way in which the judge is urged to exercise discretion.
In a larger sense, most of the evidence rules provide a bit of
guidance but leave the trial judge free to make an ad hoc decision
that balances probative value and potential prejudice. The trial
judge has so much discretion in making many evidence rulings
she effectively has the last word.94 The same approach has been
applied to managerial decisions made in advance.
Nor does the judge have to allow the parties to fully develop all
testimony orally.95 The judge may order that each witness's direct
testimony be given in writing, with only cross- and re-direct ex-
amination being done live. 96 Some judges recommend this re-
quirement only for witnesses whose "direct testimony will involve
considerable expository matter but no significant issues of credi-
bility,"97 while others recommend it more widely.98 The Central
District of California specifically provides in its local rules that
91. FED. R. EVID. 401.
92. FED. R. EVID. 403.
93. FED. R. EvID. 611(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to
secure ... [the] elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. ... ").
94. See Mengler, supra note 5, at 413; see also Waltz, supra note 5, at 1120. On ap-
peal, the need to show that an error in admitting or excluding evidence had a substantial
impact on the outcome also insulates evidence rulings from reversal. "By its operation, the
harmless error rule consequently takes some of the ruleness out of the Federal Rules."
Mengler, supra note 5, at 457.
95. Charles R. Richey, A Modern Management Technique for Trial Courts to Improve
the Quality of Justice: Requiring Direct Testimony to Be Submitted in Written Form Prior
to Trial, 72 GEO. L.J. 73, 73 (1983).
96. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION:
A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 142-43 (1982).
97. Id. at 435; CLMM supra note 3, at 387 (Sample Form 48).
98. See Richey, supra note 95, at 74 (arguing that judges have inherent power to order
written testimony).
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"i]n any matter tried to the Court, the judge may order that the
direct testimony of a witness be presented by written narrative
statement subject to the witness' cross-examination at the trial."99
It is more common in bench trials, but can be used in jury trials
as well.100 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit has characterized such orders as "a laudable effort to save
trial time" and has upheld criminal contempt sanctions against a
lawyer who refused to prepare narrative witness statements in
advance of trial.101
The judge's discretion also extends to the number and form of
exhibits. The CLMM admonishes judges that "[1]imiting the
number of exhibits and shaping those ultimately presented at
trial is an important part of structuring an effective trial ....
This can include limiting the number of exhibits, forcing the law-
yers to redact exhibits, and compelling the lawyers to justify-
before trial-each exhibit's "independent utility with regard to
specific issues or proofs."1
3
While written testimony is an indirect way to bring focus and
speed to the trial,0 4 other trial management tools go at the task
directly by creating explicit time limits.1°o Judges are granted the
authority to impose time limits by Rule 16, which itself augments
the provisions in Rules 403 and 611 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
99. C.D. CAL. R. 43-1, available at http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/CACD/LocRules.nsf
(follow "Local Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Chapter I: Local Civil Rules, Integrated with
Titles of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" hyperlink; then follow "F.R.Civ.P.43" hyper-
link).
100. See Harry J. Zeliff, Hurry Up and Wait: A Nuts and Bolts Approach to Avoiding
Wasted Time in Trial, 28 JUDGES' J. 18, 21 (1989).
101. See Chapman v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 194, 197 (9th Cir. 1979); see
also Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e have encouraged
attempts by district courts to simplify trials by requiring the parties to submit proposed
testimony."); Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 799 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1986)
(same). But see Obrey v. England, 215 F. App'x. 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding an abuse
of discretion when trial judge refused to allow live presentation of three witnesses' testi-
mony). Judges do, however, have to allow for oral supplementation of the written state-
ment and for live cross-examination and re-direct examination of the witnesses. See
Chapman, 613 F.2d at 197.
102. CLMM, supra note 3, at 82.
103. Id. at 83. The Manual also suggests using summaries. Id. at 86.
104. These techniques may or may not succeed in shortening trial time. Marcus points
out that reading a large amount of written material may actually take longer than listen-
ing to testimony. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 774.
105. Indeed, judges are encouraged to require lawyers to estimate the number of days
required for trial as early as the first pretrial conference. CLMM, supra note 3, at 21.
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dence, encouraging the judge to avoid unnecessary evidence.10
Both the CLMM and the Manual for Complex Litigation recom-
mend setting limits on trial time "[(1)] by limiting the number of
witnesses or exhibits to be offered on a particular issue or in the
aggregate; [(2)] by controlling the length of examination and
cross-examination of particular witnesses; [and (3)] by limiting
the total time allowed to each side for all direct and cross-
examination .... "107
Setting fixed pretrial limits on the quantity of evidence is a
fundamentally different kind of decision from the rulings judges
make at trial when a litigant objects to the admission of a partic-
ular piece of evidence. Both are discretionary, but the timing and
rationales vary. In the trial situation, the judge is applying Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to evidence as it is offered in
context, balancing marginal probative value against marginal
costs such as undue delay.108 The ruling is fact-dependent and
must be made quickly at a time when the impact of the evidence
is comparatively clear. A pretrial management order, however,
sets overall time limits and then requires the attorneys to priorit-
ize their evidence in order to fit within the prescribed limits. °9
The judge's decision is thus not based on the way in which a spe-
cific piece of offered evidence connects to the elements of a claim
or defense, or whether the time saving "substantially outweighs"
the probative value of that evidence; it is instead based on the
judge's decision that a certain time period is sufficient for the
overall trial of the case. On appeal, it is measured only by wheth-
er that overall limit imposed was so miserly or so inflexible that
it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion."10
The discretion accorded to management decisions does not fit
neatly within the reasons trial judges are normally given signifi-
cant discretion in evidentiary rulings. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence grant great discretion to trial judges in order (1) to allow
the admission of reliable evidence that would (under the common
106. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(2)(C)-(D).
107. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.64 (2004); see CLMM, supra
note 3, at 84-85 (suggesting judges should set time limits 'in full consultation with coun-
sel").
108. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
109. See Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal
Civil Trials, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 663, 706 (1993).
110. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983).
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law) have been inadmissible for some technical reason but is
thought to be reliable and probative; and (2) to allow contextual
snap-judgments that defy a simple set of inflexible rules, in a con-
text in which the judge cannot be expected to be perfect."' When
trials are managed for speed, though, the discretion is used to ex-
clude rather than include, and reliability is not even an issue. In
addition, the ruling is not a snap judgment made on the fly, but
one made at leisure before trial, when there is time for deliberate
thought and research.
Additional discretion comes into play in actually measuring
each party's use of its time once a limit is imposed, and methods
vary. Some courts use a stopwatch (more dignified than a basket-
ball-like shot clock mounted on the wall) to intricately allocate
the time taken for direct testimony (if live presentation is al-
lowed), cross-examination, objections, arguments on objections,
and rulings. 112 Others prefer an "hourglass" method that assesses
all time against the party calling a witness."3 Instead of creating
an overall limit, some judges instead limit the time for specific
components of the trial, "such as the time that counsel may use
for direct or cross-examination of specified expert or percipient
witnesses, to present specified tangible evidence, to conduct dem-
onstrations, or to make opening statements or closing argu-
ments." 4 And while the time limits must be flexible, the decision
whether to grant additional time is again in the hands of the trial
judge on a case-by-case basis."-' There are no explicit limits on
that discretion in the trial or evidence rules, nor has case law ar-
111. The policy favoring the admission of all relevant evidence pervades the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Rule 402 states the policy explicitly. FED. R. EVID. 402. While Rule 403
calls for weighing, it implies that weighing should result in exclusion only if the prejudice
substantially outweighs the item's probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also FED. R.
EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note (noting that in determining whether nonverbal
conduct is assertive, "ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved ... in favor of admis-
sibility"). Members of the Advisory Committee also represented to Congress that the Rules
favor admissibility. See, e.g., Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 93d Cong. 27 (1974) (testimony of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Advisory Comm.);
id. at 206 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Chairman, Advisory Comm.); Rules of Evidence:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 77 (1973) (statement of Albert E. Jenner, Chairman, Advisory
Comm.).
112. Longan, supra note 109, at 714.
113. Id.
114. 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, § 16.77[4][ii]. The CLMM also recommends that the
judge consider limiting the number of expert witnesses. CLMM, supra note 3, at 82.
115. Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1987); MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708
F.2d at 1171; United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
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ticulated a standard that does much to guide managerial discre-
tion. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that "[w]hen the manner of the presenta-
tion of information to a jury is judicially restricted to the extent
that the information becomes incomprehensible then the essence
of the trial itself has been destroyed."1 16 Since any limit that stays
on the "comprehensible" side of short is permissible, case law nei-
ther contains discussions that helpfully enunciate standards nor
gives enough examples of proper and improper management to
fill in the blanks.
Bench trials permit even greater management. The CLMM re-
commends that trial courts consider requiring the parties to
submit, in advance, narrative statements of the direct testimony
of all witnesses under a party's control, and also suggests that the
judge consider limiting testimony and exhibits, requiring advance
submission of briefs, and controlling the order of witnesses (e.g.,
hearing opposing experts back-to-back).", One judge suggested to
his colleagues an even more aggressive method for limiting test-
imony:
I hold pretrial conferences in my chambers. I first ask plaintiffs
counsel to name his witnesses and, unless he has already filed writ-
ten summaries of the witnesses' testimony, to tell me what he ex-
pects each witness will testify to. In Oregon, most lawyers use a full
range of discovery, and they usually depose every adverse witness.
After plaintiffs counsel tells me what a witness will testify to, I ask
defendant's counsel if the statement of the witness' testimony is ac-
curate. He may say, "yes", or he may say, "I can't admit the truth of
the witness' statement, but I have no evidence to contradict him. I
will admit that if the witness were called, he would so testify." In ei-
ther event, if it is a court case, we usually eliminate that witness.
Then we take up the testimony of the other witnesses.""
116. Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
That test was met in Sims, when a combination of limits was in place. Judge McBryde li-
mited a jury trial to only one day, imposed strict time limits for each segment of trial, re-
fused to permit evidence as to uncontested background facts, refused to read stipulated
facts to the jury, ordered presentation of witnesses in specific order, and repeatedly li-
mited direct and cross-examination. Id. at 848. The appellate court found that the cumula-
tive restrictions were an abuse of discretion, but nevertheless affirmed based on a conclu-
sion that the plaintiffs claim was so weak that she would have lost even without the
limits. Id. at 849-50. For more regarding Judge McBryde, who was at that time out of fa-
vor with the Fifth Circuit, see McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct &
Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 54-55 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
117. CLMM, supra note 3, at 88-89.
118. Solomon, supra note 70, at 489 (emphasis omitted).
1284 [Vol. 44:1261
THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE GOES TO TRIAL
And all this is done not at trial, but as a part of the final pretrial
conference.
4. Getting a Decision
When the reception of evidence has been completed, the judge
also has a great deal of discretion regarding how the case will be
decided. It appears that the lawyers must be afforded at least
some time for closing argument, but that time may be limited.
This principle was well established in the early days of judicial
management. For example, one 1965 case upheld a thirty-minute
closing argument in a trial that was tried over parts of five days
(eight calendar days including a long weekend), saying "a trial
judge in the federal judicial system has wide discretion in such
matters as length of counsel's argument as long as he treats both
sides substantially alike, and does not give one side a preference
or advantage over the other."119 Although lamenting the frequent
interruptions in the trial (noting that it was "not good trial prac-
tice"), the appellate court found no abuse of discretion because
"we realize that the trial judges in the Northern District of Illi-
nois are extremely busy."2 °
As between the parties, it is customary for the party with the
burden of proof (usually the plaintiff) to proceed first in opening
statements and last in closing arguments, but the court also has
discretion here. In fact, some authorities indicate that not only is
the decision discretionary, but that it is not reviewable at all.121 In
119. Alston v. West, 340 F.2d 856, 857-58 (7th Cir. 1965); see also Grey v. First Nat'l
Bank in Dallas, 393 F.2d 371, 386 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that limiting time for closing
argument would be reversed only for "egregious abuse of discretion"). The same is true in
state courts:
The time allowed counsel for argument is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, the exercise of which will not be interfered with by an appellate
tribunal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion .... General-
ly, where each side is given a single opportunity of equal length to address
the jury, no abuse of discretion is present.
75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 456 (2007); see also Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Propriety of
Trial Court Order Limiting Time for Opening or Closing Argument in Civil Case-State
Cases, 71 A.L.R. 4th 130, 136 (1989) ("It is well settled that the imposition of time limits
on the arguments of counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial court .... ").
120. See Alston, 340 F.2d at 858. Even in criminal cases, review of time limits is very
deferential. See, e.g., United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 794 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
limiting closing argument to 10 minutes for each defendant in a case covering a six-year
period and involving multiple conspiracies, 40 witnesses, 133 exhibits, a twelve-count in-
dictment, and 22 pages of jury instructions was not an abuse of discretion).
121. See Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d 1300, 1311 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Day v.
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cases involving multiple parties, especially if there is some adver-
sity between coparties, the court's discretion is quite broad.1 2 The
order of closing argument may be prescribed in the final pretrial
order. 1 23
The court also has discretion about the timing of closing argu-
ment with relation to the court's charge to the jury. Rule 51 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court "may in-
struct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged. ' 24 The
rule was amended in 1987 specifically for the purpose of giving
the court discretion to instruct the jury either before or after ar-
gument,'15 and again in 2003 to explicitly give permission for in-
terim instructions when issues are being separately tried.' 26
The substantive law does guide the content of the court's in-
struction to the jury, making management decisions a non-issue.
However, the substantive law also dictates that the instructions
need not be perfect. "No harmful error is committed if the charge
viewed as a whole correctly instructs the jury on the law, even
though a portion is technically imperfect. A district judge has
wide discretion to select his own words and to charge in his own
style .... "127
The actual format of jury instructions has long been recognized
as completely within the trial court's discretion.' 28 Rule 49 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely grants permission to use
special verdicts or general verdicts with interrogatories, and does
not even mention the most common verdict format-the general
Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 370 (1851)); JACOB A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS: THE ART AND
THE LAW § 1:6 (2d ed. 2009)).
122. See Elaine K Zipp, Annotation, Order of Closing Argument in Federal Civil Tri-
als, 53 A.L.R. FED. 900, 903-04 (1981) (discussing courts' discretion in handling rebuttals
between co-defendants).
123. See 3 MOORE ETAL., supra note 9, § 16.77[4][h].
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 51(b)(3).
125. FED. R. CIV. P. 51 (amended 1987); FED. R. CIV. P. 51 advisory committee's note
(1987 amend.).
126. FED. R. CIv. P. 51 (amended 2003); FED. R. CIv. P. 51 advisory committee's note
(2003 amend.).
127. Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co., 764 F.2d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 424-26 (5th Cir. 1985); Andry v. Farrell Lines,
Inc., 478 F.2d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1973)).
128. See 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, §§ 2506, 2508; see also Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, The Power and the Process: Instructions and the Civil Jury, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1837, 1840-43 (1998).
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verdict."' It neither requires any particular format nor provides
any guidance as to the internal format of whatever option is cho-
sen.'30 If the judge chooses a general verdict with special interro-
gatories, the judge does not need to include all the issues in the
case, but instead has discretion to highlight those he chooses.", In
fact, the judge can make a format decision "for any reason or no
reason whatever" without being reversed.'12
Jury charge formats, however, could also be employed by a
judge seeking to save time.13  For example, even in a case tried in
a unitary manner, a judge could identify a single issue or cluster
of issues with the potential to dispose of the case, place questions
framing those issues at the beginning of the charge, and instruct
the jury that certain answers to those questions mean that no
further action is required. The judge could also create a potential-
ly shorter deliberation period by conditioning the need to answer
the damages issue on a positive finding of liability. Similarly,
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's explicit permis-
sion to give the jury interim instructions3 4 reinforces and enables
the court's decision to use separate trials and bifurcation as man-
agement tools.
IV. ASSESSING TRIAL-STAGE MANAGEMENT
Critics of judicial management in the pretrial context have
charged that while managerial judging may (or may not) result in
a saving of judicial time, it raises substantial concerns: (1) it in-
volves judges so intimately in the parties' information and strate-
gies that it may compromise the judges' impartiality; (2) it leads
to a loss of transparency as more decisions are made off the
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
130. See 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, §§ 2506, 2508, 2512.
131. Id.
132. Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 67 (2d Cir. 1948). One broad
survey of all the issues arising out of charge format concluded that "[oln almost every is-
sue that has arisen, the appellate courts have told their colleagues of the trial bench only
that the decision rests in their sole discretion .... The monotonous regularity [of this reci-
tation has] the flavor of a litany pronounced in lieu of a consideration of the issues in-
volved in an appeal." Robert Dudnik, Comment, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 YALE L. J. 483, 518-19 (1965).
133. See CLMM, supra note 3, at 84 (proposing seriatim verdicts, general verdicts with
interrogatories, and/or special verdicts as ways to manage the jury more efficiently).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3). The court "may instruct the jury at any time before the
jury is discharged." Id.
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record or in chambers; (3) management decisions are not guided
by meaningful judicial standards, resulting in inconsistent ad hoc
rulings; (4) management decisions can redistribute strategic ad-
vantages and disadvantages and even affect case outcomes; and
(5) there is often no effective appeal of a trial court's management
decision.13 This part will consider whether these same critiques
apply to managerial trials. It will also examine whether trial-
stage management introduces additional process concerns by de-
creasing party autonomy and participation in the trial itself.
A. Judges in the Trenches
The traditional adversary-system judge is passive. Rather than
injecting himself into the proceeding, he waits for the lawyers to
bring a dispute to him. While it is questionable that this purely
reactive role was ever the norm, 1 6 the managerial judge clearly
is-and is intended to be-far more involved. And what distin-
guishes the judge as manager from the judge as arbiter of dis-
putes is the nature and purpose of that involvement. In the inter-
est of moving a case along more expeditiously, the managerial
judge imposes early deadlines, enters orders limiting use of dis-
covery devices and time for pretrial developments, and uses the
many tools at his disposal to try to push the parties toward set-
tlement.'37 This greater involvement imparts more detailed in-
formation about the case. The Federal Courts Study Committee
found that most judges agreed that the settlement role, in partic-
ular, "effectively requires the judge to obtain a detailed know-
ledge of the parties' contentions, the facts in dispute, and the le-
gal theories involved."13 For example, the CLMM suggests, as a
settlement tool, that a judge require the parties to "submit confi-
dential memoranda outlining the pivotal issues, the critical evi-
dence, and their settlement positions."39
135. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
136. See Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Man-
agement, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Attentive Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 253, 254 (1985). "Judges have long engaged in some form of case and calendar man-
agement as well as court administration, mediation, regulation of the bar, and other pro-
fessional activities." Id. at 261.
137. Resnik, supra note 1, at 399; see also Elliott, supra note 1, at 309.
138. I JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 52, at 51.
139. CLMM, supra note 3, at 61.
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In the pretrial context, this greater involvement comes with
the risk of judicial bias about the case, the parties, or the lawyers.
As Resnik pointed out,
The extensive information that judges receive during pretrial confe-
rences has not been filtered by the rules of evidence. Some of this in-
formation is received ex parte, a process that deprives the opposing
party of the opportunity to contest the validity of information re-
ceived. Moreover, judges are in close contact with attorneys during
the course of management. Such interactions may become occasions
for the development of intense feelings-admiration, friendship, or
antipathy. Therefore, management becomes a fertile field for the
growth of personal bias.14 °
This is not the type of bias, however, that generally leads to dis-
qualification or recusal under judicial ethics codes. Unless a judge
finds that her involvement in pretrial management means that
her "impartiality might reasonably be questioned," the judge's
awareness of the parties' contentions or even their evidence is not
thought to constitute prohibited bias or "personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts.1141
But does the "over-involvement" critique apply to managerial
trials as well? Of course it does. Pretrial and trial are actually
parts of a continuum, and a detailed trial plan is the place where
pretrial bleeds into trial. The judge may have learned much about
the case while managing pretrial, and that knowledge is not mag-
ically forgotten when the trial begins. In addition, trial manage-
ment requires a continuation of the kinds of involvement that
marked the pretrial period. In fact, trial management compounds
the systemic drawbacks of pretrial management, like bias and
arbitrary decisions. In order to choose time limits that are fair
and efficient, a judge must fully immerse herself in the issues
and evidence in the case.' Further, a desire to take over jury se-
140. Resnik, supra note 1, at 427. Resnik also suggests that the judge may acquire in-
terests of his own that conflict with those of the litigants: "Further, judges with supervi-
sory obligations may gain stakes in the cases they manage. Their prestige may ride on 'ef-
ficient' management, as calculated by the speed and number of dispositions. Competition
and peer pressure may tempt judges to rush litigants because of reasons unrelated to the
merits of disputes." Id.
141. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canons 3C(1), 36(1)(a) (2009) [he-
reinafter CODE OF CONDUCT].
142. See Longan, supra note 109, at 711. Longan suggests that judges will have ac-
quired expertise in setting trial time limits from their experience setting time limits for
discovery and assigning cases to various time "tracks" in managing pretrial proceedings.
Id. at 712. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 16 suggest that the court should im-
pose time limits "only after receiving appropriate submissions from the parties outlining
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lection and opening statements requires extensive knowledge of
the parties' evidence and litigation strategies. For these reasons,
the final pretrial conference and its associated disclosure re-
quirements will continue the judge's intimate involvement with
the parties and lawyers. For example, a judicial order to file
narrative summaries of the testimony of all witnesses would re-
veal information not normally disclosed until each witness testi-
fies at trial. Judicial pressure to agree, at the conference in
chambers, that the opposing side's witness is telling the truth,
and to expand the scope of undisputed facts, also expands the
judge's knowledge and involvement.
There are no structural limits in place to protect against the
judge carrying into the trial any bias that may have resulted from
earlier contacts. The ethical rules for federal judges actually al-
low them to engage in settlement activities, including ex parte
communications.14 And while there is considerable sentiment
that a judge who has participated closely in encouraging settle-
ment should not preside over a bench trial on the merits, fewer
judges doubt that they may continue to act in a trial to a jury.'"
Once the trial has begun, the judge's information about the
case (other than continuing involvement in settlement negotia-
tions) seems more likely to come from evidence offered at trial, in
a manner consistent with the traditional role of the judge. Even
though the judge will continue to make managerial decisions-
about issues such as number of jurors, jury selection methods,
deviation from time limits, rulings on evidence, and the format
and content of the jury charge-few are accompanied by addi-
tional disclosures of otherwise private information.
the nature of the testimony expected to be presented through various witnesses, and the
expected duration of direct and cross-examination." FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory commit-
tee's note (1993 amend.).
143. See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, Canon 3A(4)(d) and commentary (autho-
rizing ex parte contact with consent of parties and endorsing judges' participation in set-
tlement efforts so long as no party is coerced into surrendering the right to have the dis-
pute resolved by the courts).
144. WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVjL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEws ABOUT APPROPRIATE
ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 84-85, 88 (1985). But see John
C. Cratsley, Judicial Ethics and Judicial Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to
Meet, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 569, 589 (2006). To the extent that district judges
react to the criticism of their involvement in pretrial management by referring those du-
ties to magistrate judges, the total pool of persons making unreviewable discretionary de-
cisions has expanded.
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In summary, trial management that comes in the immediate
pretrial period is subject to the same critique as pretrial man-
agement when it comes to the judge's exposure to the intimate
details of trial planning and continued efforts to encourage set-
tlement. Once the trial begins, on the other hand, additional dan-
ger on this account is limited, though the judge's reactions at trial
will be affected by all that came before.
B. Loss of Transparency
Critics of pretrial management often note that the judge's in-
volvement in the case is more likely to be in chambers, off the
record, and less visible than traditional case processing. 145 This is
more often the case with settlement-oriented management, from
conferences with the judge to court-annexed ADR techniques.
Pretrial conferences are also off the public radar, although orders
documenting any decisions made at those conferences will gener-
ally be filed in the public record; the CLMM recommends that the
judge have a transcript made of the final pretrial conference.146
Settlement conferences, though, will be just as lacking in trans-
parency as those held before trial, and settlement agreements are
often unfiled or sealed in the interests of promoting the parties'
willingness to settle.14 7
It is important to note that there are three facets to the lack of
transparency. One is literal unavailability-conversations about
the case that are neither made in open court nor filed in the
court's records. Another is non-transparency of reasons-a lack of
explanation for the basis of a court's decision. Since many mana-
gerial orders are case-specific and not based on concrete stan-
dards, those orders often provide no reasoned explanation for the
decisions: Why eight jurors? Why thirty minutes of opening
statement? Why five days of trial? Why written evidence? Why a
special verdict?14 In that latter sense, trial-based case manage-
ment orders can be as non-transparent as pretrial ones. Third,
there is a lack of big-picture transparency for the purpose of eva-
145. Resnik, supra note 1, at 378.
146. CLMM, supra note 3, at 78. If never transcribed and filed, however, the public will
have little access to the information.
147. See Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 955, 1010-29 (1988).
148. See I JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 52, at 55 (noting that judges
do not need to supply a "reasoned justification" for managerial orders).
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luating the systemic effects of managerial decisions. Trial court
orders setting out management limits, even if they were more in-
formative, are not apt to be published; settled cases will not be
appealed; and there are few appellate decisions evaluating specif-
ic examples of implemented management techniques (certainly
nothing broad-based enough or representative enough to serve as
a basis for policy decisions). 149
The trial itself will, in the overwhelming majority of cases, be
open to the public. 150 However, despite Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure's requirement that the testimony of wit-
nesses "be taken in open court,"151 courts have interpreted Rule
611 of the Federal Rules of Evidence's directive to "exercise rea-
sonable control over the mode and order of interrogating wit-
nesses and presenting evidence""' to authorize a requirement
that all direct testimony be presented in writing.1 3 This man-
agement technique will result in a loss of orality, and a courtroom
spectator might easily hear only the live cross-examination ra-
ther than a witness's entire testimony."5 As Marcus has argued,
[Tihere should be concern about whether the in-court activities that
remain can be understood. If the proceedings are dispositive but
cryptic, they could undermine the values protected by the public's
right of access. How does the public evaluate, or even follow, a "trial"
in which most of the evidence has been delivered in writing in ad-
vance?
55
While the written statements will be admitted into evidence, and
thus be part of the record, they are not as accessible to the public
as live oral testimony.
149. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?-The Need for a Cleaner Judicial
Role in Settlement, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 45, 49 (1994).
150. See FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
152. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
153. Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1997); Adair
v. Sunwest Bank (In re Adair), 965 F.2d 777, 778 (9th Cir. 1992); Kuntz v. Sea Eagle Di-
ving Adventures Corp., 199 F.R.D. 665, 667 (D. Haw. 2001). To avoid the Rule 43 problem,
courts will ask the parties to waive the "open court" requirement in the joint pretrial
statement. See CLMM, supra note 3, at 362-63 (providing sample stipulation in pretrial
order).
154. A sample pretrial order appended to the CLMM, for example, requires that the
witness be called to authenticate the statement, that the statement be marked and intro-
duced as an exhibit, after which any live cross-examination or re-direct examination will
take place. CLMM, supra note 3, at 387.
155. Marcus, supra note 3, at 779.
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Lack of transparency in terms of lack of explanation remains a
problem for trial-stage management. Lack of transparency in
terms of inaccessible information also occurs during the trial
phase, particularly when final pretrial conferences are not tran-
scribed, when written testimony is used, and when in-chambers
settlement efforts by the judge continue into the trial phase. In-
formation not offered into evidence in order to comply with time
limits is also lost to public view. Greater public access to an ac-
tual trial makes the privacy critique less applicable, however, to
trial management that occurs in open court during the trial itself,
and the fact that a trial has taken place will make the content of
the evidence offered a part of the public record.
C. Inconsistent, Ad Hoc Decision Making
Trial court judges have a great deal of discretion in making
most of their procedural decisions. In some ways, neither the ex-
istence of discretion nor the concern for efficiency is unique to de-
cisions that would be labeled specifically "managerial." 56 For ex-
ample, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the judge to
consider efficiency (sometimes under the rubric of "prejudice")
when making decisions about issues such as joinder of claims and
parties, 157 pleading amendments, 158 intervention, 159 scope of dis-
covery,160 use of discovery devices,' 61 extra time to respond to a
motion for summary judgment, 162 and late-demanded juries. 63 In
fact, the very first rule posits the efficiency issue, as judges are
instructed to interpret the rules to achieve "the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination" of cases. 6 4 Likewise, the Federal
156. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 673-74 ("Because decisions on pretrial motions are likely to evade
appellate review, such decisions also have large doses of the uncontrolled discretion that
marks 'management.' Seen from a more distant historical perspective, virtually all of
modem litigation is more 'managerial' than was litigation in earlier periods.").
157. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 18, 20.
158. See FED. R. CIv. P. 15.
159. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).
160. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b).
161. See FED. R. CIv. P. 29.
162. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
163. See FED. R. Crv. P. 14, 18, 39(b).
164. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
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Rules of Evidence make the avoidance of prejudice, including pre-
judice from delay, a pervasive consideration.'15
Yet some commentators agree that there is something qualita-
tively different about the kinds of decisions that are managerial
in nature and the kind of discretion exercised in more traditional
rulings.166 Even other discretionary procedural decisions differ
from those designed solely to manage the litigation. Why? The
decisions are different because managerial ones are guided not by
substantive law but by the judge's "feel" for what the case de-
serves, because they focus on the court's benefit more than the
parties' comparative needs, and because they ask the court to
look beyond the particular lawsuit to consider the needs of other
users of the court system. Beyond a generalized desire to be more
efficient or speedier, these decisions are not limited by the kind of
articulated standards that can actually guide the exercise of dis-
cretion.
With regard to pretrial management decisions, Resnik ob-
served in her original article that
no explicit norms or standards guide judges in their decisions about
what to demand of litigants. What does "good," "skilled," or "judi-
cious" management entail? Judge Kinser [the judge in Resnik's hy-
pothetical pretrial case] hoped to speed pretrial preparation, because
he thought quick preparation was better than slow preparation. Yet
he had no guidelines, other than his own intuition, to inform him
what was too slow or too fast. Judge Kinser wanted the parties to
settle, because he believed that whatever outcomes settlement pro-
duced would be better-and less expensive-than those litigation
could achieve. But how was he to determine, for the litigants and for
the system as a whole, what was "better" or less "expensive"?'67
Elliott noted that management is also not defined by the use of
a limited number of devices. 61 "What makes the managerial judg-
ing movement coherent is not so much the existence of specific
techniques on which all managerial judges agree. Rather, mana-
gerial judges are distinguished by common themes in their rhe-
toric."69
165. See FED. R. EVID. 403, 611.
166. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 1, at 310-11.
167. Resnik, supra note 1, at 426 (footnote omitted).
168. See Elliott, supra note 1, at 309.
169. Id.
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As Charles Yablon argued in his discussion of judicial discre-
tion, one can analyze discretionary decisions according to the way
the judge explains those decisions.70 In some situations, which
Yablon describes as the invocation of "discretion as skill," judges
justify decisions based not on the application of a correct rule but
on the judge's skill and experience. 7, The judge has a large, but
not exhaustive, set of options and will justify her decision by
claiming that she is exercising "skillful, practical judgment" to
choose the most appropriate result for the case. 17 2
The justification of discretion in such cases, the deference to trial
court decisions, rests on a claim that the trial judge has special
knowledge that enables her to achieve an answer better than any
that could be obtained by simply following rules laid down by a
higher court or legislature.
173
While judges entering managerial pretrial orders seldom articu-
late the basis for their decisions, when they do so they will justify
their decisions by a highly fact-based demonstration showing
they have made their decision in a skillful way.174 In the case of
decisions based on managerial principles, the decisions will dis-
cuss the procedural details of the case and invoke the need to re-
duce length and expense of litigation.175
Nor does appellate review provide guidance to trial judges.
Most managerial orders never reach the court of appeals, since
they are not immediately appealable and most cases settle.16
Even when they do, appellate courts are extremely deferential to
the trial court's superior "fact competence."177 Unless the trial
court takes some action that exceeds the court's power,'78 the ap-
170. Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 235 (1990).
171. Id. at 261-62.
172. Id. at 262.
173. Id.; see also Maureen Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the
1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 751 (1996) ("This unwillingness to
justify by any means other than to point to the facts, their discretion and their experience
may in fact be one of the more interesting defining characteristics of the courts' practice.").
174. "Trial court opinions.., seek to demonstrate that the decision was made skillful-
ly, carefully, and with attention to all the facts.... Thus, the trial court judge justifies her
decision not by showing that it is correct, but by demonstrating her superior institutional
competence to the appellate court." Yablon, supra note 170, at 267-68.
175. See id. at 251.
176. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 76-77.
177. See Armour, supra note 173, at 748-49.
178. There is, for example, a split over whether district judges have the power to order
parties to participate in summary jury trials. One line of cases finds such orders beyond
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pellate court will merely recite that the standard of review is
"abuse of discretion" and that the court has acted appropriately
within the scope of available options. There is no "rule" to apply
to compare the judge's decision with accurate application of the
law. For all these reasons, no body of appellate law setting out
meaningful standards has developed either to correct individual
decisions or to provide substantive content to the balancing of
justice and expedience.'79
Does the critique of managerial judging as essentially ad hoc
also apply to trial management decisions? The Seventh Amend-
ment and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pre-
serve the right to trial by jury (when a timely request is made).,s0
Because the elements of claims and defenses outline the borders
of relevance and required findings, the substantive law con-
strains some decisions about the shape of the lawsuit and the
admissibility of evidence. 18' But most managerial decisions that
attempt to settle the case and govern the order, length, and na-
ture of trial proceedings are as standard-free as those made in
the pretrial stage. An imperative for brevity and focus prevails,
but with little guidance about how precisely to get there and how
to balance those desires against the parties' desire to fully tell
their stories and present their cases.
Decisions that slice and dice the trial-consolidation, separate
trial, and bifurcation-require a mixture of law and management.
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs
both consolidation and separate trial, turns in part on whether
claims will overlap and whether issues are separate:
Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials
(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common
question of law or fact, the court may:
(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in
the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
the power granted by the rules. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884,
885-87 (7th Cir. 1988). The authorization became more explicit in the 1993 amendments
to Rule 16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(I). Nevertheless, at least some circuits continue to
find mandatory summary jury trials to exceed the power of the court. See, e.g., In re NLO,
5 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1993).
179. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 378; see also Peterson, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing
the lack of effective appeal).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or
delay.
(b) Separate Trials. For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to
expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of
one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counter-
claims, or third-party claims. 18
2
The question of whether actions share a "common question of
law or fact" and thus may be consolidated turns on whether the
evidence sufficiently overlaps or there is some other logical tie
that creates a convenient trial package. The question whether
distinct claims and issues may be tried separately turns on
whether they are "separate." Both of these determinations de-
pend on what evidence the substantive law makes relevant. l3
Thus, in our hypothetical case, Judge Kinser would have to con-
clude that the five cases involving the Nano pending against the
defendant car manufacturer would, based on the applicable subs-
tantive law, involve enough overlapping evidence that consolida-
tion would be proper. Similarly, in bifurcating the trial of the Na-
no cases, Judge Kinser would have to find that the issues could
be separated without substantial overlap. For this part of the
consolidation/ bifurcation analysis, if the judge writes an order
justifying his decision, the judge's reasoning will be based on arti-
culable standards and substantive law.
Yet both decisions also turn on efficiency, and thus directly in-
vite case management. Consolidation is designed to avoid "unne-
cessary cost or delay," but the existence of common questions
does not require a joint trial.'8 The court must balance the poten-
tial savings of time and effort against inconvenience, delay, or
expense that might result from consolidation. 8' When considering
whether to bifurcate, Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure expressly directs the judge to consider how to "expedite and
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
183. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1494-97 (11th
Cir. 1985) (consolidating four asbestosis claims); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug Inc., 415 F.2d
1009, 1012 (5th Cir. 1969) (consolidating two claims against drug manufacturer); Hamre
v. Mizra, No.02Civ.9088(PKL)(HBP), 2005 WL 1083978, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2005)
(bifurcating liability and damages in medical negligence case); Corrigan v. Methodist
Hosp., 160 F.R.D. 55, 57-58 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying bifurcation because of substantial
evidence overlap). When the bifurcated elements will be tried by separate juries, Seventh
Amendment concerns can prevent bifurcation if a finding might be "re-examined" because
of overlap. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978).
184. FED. R. Crv. P. 42(a).
185. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D. Del. 1981).
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economize."1 86 When it comes to the management part of the deci-
sion, Rule 42 "giv[es] the district court virtually unlimited free-
dom to try the issues in whatever way trial convenience re-
quires." 187 The highly contextual nature of these decisions makes
it difficult to generalize, and the courts of appeals are extremely
deferential to the trial court's predictions of time saving.1' Guid-
ance on this part of the balancing calculus remains sparse, and
decisions are thus far more likely to be based on excessive overlap
of the elements in trial components or strategic prejudice (such as
preventing the jury from seeing severely injured plaintiffs) rather
than on the estimates of time savings.
This critique of the arbitrary nature of managerial decisions
holds even more true for more direct trial-stage time manage-
ment, as these decisions lack the substantive law element that
provides at least some constraints on consolidation and bifurca-
tion. There is the same general feeling that "shorter is better,"
but the desire for efficiency should not completely deprive the
parties of a fair trial. Similar to pretrial management decisions,
there is no established body of legal principles on which the par-
ties can rely when making arguments about litigation timing.
There will be no body of case law from which one can conclude
that ten minutes is too little but thirty is enough, that two wit-
nesses are too little but five are enough, or that a little settlement
pressure is fine but that more is too much. 89
Trial judges tend to enter orders that set a time limit but do
not explain the choice of the particular number of days, hours,
minutes, witnesses, or exhibits. A fellow judge trying to provide
consistency, and thus trying to deduce the basis for other judges'
limits, would have to seek out the pleadings and pretrial orders
in a number of cases to begin to see patterns, and even then the
connections between that information and the chosen practices
186. FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b).
187. 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, § 2387. As Marcus has noted, individual
judges may react to proposed consolidation differently: "a given level of joinder might be
efficient for Judge A, but not for Judge B." Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dis-
persed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel's Trans-
fer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2254 (2008).
188. See, e.g., Huffman v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (In re Benedectin Litigation), 857
F.2d 290, 316-17 (6th Cir. 1988).
189. See id. at 317; Peterson, supra note 1, at 76 ("The vast majority of all managerial
decisions are unwritten and unreported. Thus, there is neither case law nor written rules
to guide a judge or to provide parties with arguments to control a judge's discretion.").
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would be inferential. The orders also rely on information orally
conveyed to each judge that will not appear in the record. Ulti-
mately, the rulings are based on what a particular judge, in his
own experience, thinks is the time needed for a streamlined trial.
The tie between proposed evidence and time limits is even mur-
kier because the managerial judge is not merely balancing the
competing needs of the parties to the case before him; he is ba-
lancing the needs of this case against the public's interest in giv-
ing the court system time to handle other cases. 9 °
Systematic guidance is also rare because the managerial trial
decisions are rarely appealed, 191 and thus no body of appellate law
has developed from which one could infer a range of appropriate
actions. The occasional appellate decision that does discuss a ma-
nagerial order, such as a time limit, tends only to note that the
particular decision was within the judge's discretion. 2 The rare
cases finding an abuse of discretion often address a collection of
techniques, making it difficult to assess the propriety of any sin-
gle decision. 193 Most merely find that the use of a particular device
was not an abuse of discretion.194
That leaves judicial training, conferences, and presentations,
in which judges recommend management techniques to other
judges, as potential sources of standards, consistency, or guid-
ance. The CLMM, designed to help guide judges, tends not to
provide guidelines regarding when to use particular devices or
what limits to impose. 95 Instead, the book's format proceeds in
the following manner: each book section introduces a stage of the
trial process, discusses the general benefits of management, and
then suggests actions that the judge should "consider" without
providing guidance as to the relevant considerations. 196 With re-
gard to time limits, for example, the manual states, "Counsel
190. See Newman, supra note 37, at 1644 ("A broadened concept of fairness--one that
includes fairness not only toward litigants in an individual case but also to all who use or
wish to use the litigation system and to all who are affected by it-can lead to changes
that directly confront the challenges of delay and expense.").
191. Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,425-26 (2007).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1997).
193. See, e.g., Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846,849 (5th Cir. 1996).
194. See, e.g., Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir.
1997) (upholding bankruptcy court's requirement of written testimony); MCI Commc'ns
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing time limits); Alston
v. West, 340 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1965) (discussing time limits for closing argument).
195. See CLMM, supra note 3, at 1-3.
196. See id. at 3, 5-7.
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should be forced to estimate, and you can subsequently hone and
accede to, time necessary for each major trial event from opening
statements through closing arguments."117 The manual goes on to
list specific elements of trial that can be limited but, other than
being clear that limits are beneficial, shares no instruction on
how to know how far to go in choosing methods or numbers. 118 The
manual then discusses trial management techniques generally. 19
Which ones should judges use? "Not all [of the listed management
techniques] will be appropriate for any given trial, but all are
worthy of your consideration in the process of arriving at a suita-
ble trial management plan." 0
The result is a hodgepodge of potentially inconsistent rulings
that vary from judge to judge and case to case. Some judges who
are not managerially inclined will do only the minimum amount
of managing required by Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.2 °' Others who are enthusiastic proponents of case
management will do their best to incite settlement, control many
aspects of the case, and impose strict limits on the lawyers. Most,
somewhere in the middle, will do their best to use their own ex-
periences and intuitions and will use some management tech-
niques and impose some limits on the course of litigation and tri-
al.
Whether one views management on the whole as a good idea or
a bad one, inconsistency in management has consequences. If
managerial trials involved no more than slightly increased pa-
perwork and enforced focus, the variations would be annoying but
not very important. At least in some cases, however, decisions la-
beled as managerial can affect the parties' strategic advantages
and influence the outcome of the case. The next section discusses
this possibility.
197. Id. at 84.
198. See id. at 84-85; see also Solomon, supra note 70, at 486 (urging other judges to
try techniques he describes).
199. See CLMM, supra note 3, at 86-89.
200. Id. at 86. The bulleted list that follows includes limits on voir dire, daily confe-
rences, limits on the volume of exhibits, limits on use of depositions, encouraging stipula-
tions, and minimizing disruptive sidebar conferences. Id. at 86-87.
201. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (governing pretrial conferences, scheduling, and manage-
ment); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (governing disclosure and general discovery provisions).
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D. Management and the Merits
Commentators who have examined pretrial management tech-
niques have noted a variety of ways in which decisions made in
the interest of efficiency may shape the outcome of the case. 20 2
Most notably, if restrictions on discovery scope, devices, and time
period preclude the party with the burden of proof from pursuing
various avenues of information, the court has indirectly limited
the issues in the case or created a situation in which the informa-
tion-poor litigant may fail to discover evidence that would sup-
port a claim or defense. 213
Judge Robert Peckham, an early and enthusiastic supporter of
case management, conceded that managerial orders could take
issues out of the case: "Admittedly, in limiting the scope of dis-
covery, setting schedules, and narrowing issues, the [managerial
judge] restricts somewhat the attorneys' freedom to pursue their
actions in an unfettered fashion and eliminates entirely some
theories or lines of inquiry."2 4 While the judge has not ruled on
the merits, as when he grants a motion for failure to state a claim
or motion for summary judgment, the judge has forced the liti-
gant to prioritize within the budgeted time. 20 5 As Elliott points
out, the effect of these early managerial orders can be to re-
introduce two problems that plagued common law and code
pleading-"premature definition of issues, and outcomes based on
preliminary procedural skirmishing rather than the legal merit of
claims. 20 6 Peterson's assessment, which includes the judge's pres-
sures to settle, is even more critical:
Cases are made and broken by judges at the pretrial stage. A district
judge can substantially determine the outcome of a case, including
the amount and terms of the settlement, by defining the scope of a
claim or permissible defenses, controlling and regulating discovery,
and then encouraging and directing settlement negotiations. With-
out guidelines or appellate review to regulate the pretrial process,
similar cases will have decidedly different outcomes.2 7
202. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 136, at 262.
203. See Elliott, supra note 1, at 314-15.
204. See Peckham, supra note 136, at 262.
205. See Elliott, supra note 1, at 315.
206. Id. at 321.
207. Peterson, supra note 1, at 81.
2010] 1301
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Do trial-stage management techniques also have the potential
to shape outcomes? Absolutely. While this will not always be
true, several trial-stage management techniques can affect the
comparative fortunes of the parties. In addition to management
techniques imposing pressure to actually drop claims or defenses,
some can affect outcome by changing the flow of the case. Empiri-
cal studies have shown that the bifurcation of cases can influence
outcomes: the breaking apart in and of itself affects juror thought
processes, 2°8 and the order of decisions is also important.2°9 The
use of written testimony and summaries can dampen the imme-
diacy of evidence in ways that may disadvantage the party with
the burden of proof. Time limits require the same kind of triage
as limits on discovery, but by means that are closer in time and
impact to the outcome of the case. And jury instruction formats
can have the same kind of effects as bifurcation.
Putting things together and taking them apart can provide
strategic advantages and disadvantages. Litigants clearly believe
this. For example, it is generally defendants who request bifurca-
tion of liability and damages, and researchers report that the de-
fense wins almost twice as often when the issues are separated.210
Explanations for those results differ, with some believing that bi-
furcation prevents the jury from ruling for the plaintiff based
solely on sympathy, and others contending that the difference re-
sults from bifurcation's disruption of the inherent interrelation-
ship of issues and normal human information processing.2 11
208. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Ex-
ample of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834 (1961).
209. See Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 215-16 (2006).
210. See Warren F. Schwartz, Severance-A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden
and Expense in Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1210 (1967)
(citing Charles Alan Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.
J. 742, 747 (1966)); Weinstein, supra note 208, at 834-35; Hans Zeisel & Thomas Calla-
han, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1606, 1612
tbl.3 (1963) (reporting that bifurcation cut plaintiffs' win rates from 66% to 44%); see also
Dan Cytryn, Bifurcation in Personal Injury Cases: Should Judges Be Allowed to Use the
"B" Word?, 26 NOVA. L. REV. 249, 267 (2001) (arguing that bifurcation is highly favorable
to the defendant); Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How
Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 513-14 (1995) (ar-
guing the same).
211. See Tom Alan Cunningham & Paula K Hutchinson, Bifurcated Trials:. Creative
Uses of the Moriel Decision, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 807, 812 (1994) (discussing bifurcation's
impact on jury sympathy); Marcus, supra note 3, at 768 (discussing jury comprehension);
Thornburg, supra note 128, at 1859-60. What matters here, though, is that there is a dif-
ference in outcome when different management techniques are chosen, not the reason for
the differences.
1302 [Vol. 44:1261
THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE GOES TO TRIAL
The results in routine personal injury cases also appear to hold
true in more complex litigation. One influential article reported
that experiments with sixty-six juries showed that plaintiffs did
better significantly more often in unitary trials. 212 Consolidation,
at least when it involves very large numbers of parties and asso-
ciated management techniques (including bellwether trials and
sampling), may also affect the outcome.213 In mass tort cases,
some argue that consolidation and transfer by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") has benefitted defendants
more than plaintiffs "thanks to several rulings by MDL judges
aggressively policing the mass torts transferred to their cour-
trooms "214
The existence of splitting does not necessarily determine with
which party advantage lies. As noted above, conventional wisdom
is that defendants will benefit from bifurcation. Hence, in In re
Benedictin Litigation, when the trial court subdivided the trial
into causation, liability, and damages, and excluded from the
courtroom in the early phase all visibly deformed plaintiffs, it
was the plaintiffs who complained that they had been denied the
"right to present to the jury the full atmosphere of their cause of
action, including the reality of injury."215
At times, however, courts will shift the order of segments of the
bifurcated trial, in a procedure called "reverse bifurcation."216 The
purpose of this ordering is often to provide the parties with suffi-
cient certainty about potential damages to facilitate settlement
discussions.2 17 Defendants occasionally seek this order as a way to
212. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Im-
pact of Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22, 26 (1989) (reporting,
however, that plaintiffs who made it to the damages phase of a bifurcated trial received
significantly higher damage awards than the plaintiffs in the unitary trials).
213. See Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of
Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be Part II: Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 42
UCLA L. REV. 967, 967-70 (1995) (discussing the many ways in which consolidation can
alter the rights of the litigants).
214. Marcus, supra note 187, at 2290 (quoting Alison Frankel, It's Over, Tort Refor-
mers, Business Interests, and Plaintiffs Lawyers Themselves Have Helped Kill the Mass
Torts Bonanza-And It's Not Coming Back, AM. LAW., Dec. 2006, at 78, 108).
215. Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (In re Bendectin Litigation), 857 F.2d 290,
315-16 (6th Cir. 1988). This is often referred to as the "sterile trial atmosphere" problem.
See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 714 (2000) (cit-
ing Hoffman, 857 F.2d at 215-16; Kiser v. Bryant Elec. (In re Beverly Hills Fire Litiga-
tion), 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982)).
216. See generally Stevenson, supra note 209.
217. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Little-Noticed 9/11 Lawsuits Will Get Their Day in
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clarify and limit the plaintiffs actual damages, or perhaps to
end the case if they believe that plaintiff has not been damaged,
or that the damages were not caused by defendant's acts. More
commonly, however, defendants are appalled by the possibility of
beginning the case with the presentation of evidence of the plain-
tiffs' damages. For example, a coalition of business and insurance
interests filed an amicus brief with a Pennsylvania appellate
court, arguing that reverse bifurcation "causes substantial preju-
dice to asbestos defendants."219 The Federalist Society published
an article condemning two reverse bifurcation plans in which de-
fendant's liability for punitive damages (as well as a "multiplier"
to use with later-determined actual damages) would be tried
first.2 ° Order matters, and even if the judge has only efficiency in
mind, the managerial decision to cut and arrange the pieces of
the lawsuit pie can have effects on the outcome.
Other decisions about the size and order of proceedings can al-
so provide advantages and disadvantages. Decisions regarding
which party gets to open and close evidence, or open and close fi-
nal argument, allocate the well-documented benefits of primacy
and recency. 221
Limits on the time and subject matter of voir dire have the po-
tential to make an important difference in the composition of the
jury. The voir dire process is intended to provide the attorneys
with enough information to identify and eliminate potential ju-
rors whose attitudes make them naturally inclined toward one
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at Al (reporting that damages issue would be tried first).
Another "order of trial" technique, used in mass tort cases, is the bellwether trial, where a
sampling of individual cases is chosen for early trials to help the parties assess the settle-
ment value of the larger group of cases. See generally R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing
Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do the Constitution and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199 (1999). Clearly the choice
of bellwether cases can create advantages and disadvantages for the settlement negotia-
tions that follow.
218. See Steven H. Pollack, Fen-Phen Trials May Test New Damages System, LAW.COM,
Dec. 1, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/Law ArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005541385 (on file
with author).
219. Application of Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. et al. to Join as Amici Curiae in
the Application of Hobart Bros. Co. and Lincoln Electric Co. for En Banc Reargument, Do-
noughe v. Hobart Bros. Co., Nos. 357 & 488 EDA 2006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), at 2.
220. Mark A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, "Reverse Bifurcation"Approach to Puni-
tive Damages in West Virginia, CLASS ACTION WATCH, March 2008, at 7-8, available at
http://www.fed-soc.orgdoclib/20080404_CAW7.1.pdf.
221. See Longan, supra note 109, at 705 (citing JEANNE ELLIS ORMROD, HUMAN
LEARNING 149 (1990)).
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side or the other 222-either with a challenge for cause, when a
panel member is willing to state that he cannot set aside his bias,
or with a peremptory challenge when the bias is less pronounced
(or when the panelist responds to judicial prompting by stating
that he will follow the judge's instructions despite the bias). A
more limited opportunity for voir dire provides less information
with which to intelligently exercise those challenges.2 23 It is hard
to know in advance whether this limited information will cut in
any particular direction, but it is logical to assume that the party
who is most hurt by pervasive cultural biases will suffer from the
inability to raise these issues during voir dire and to identify the
potential jurors who hold those views.224
Management decisions that limit the presentation of evi-
dence-by imposing an overall time limit, by imposing a limit on
the number of witnesses or exhibits, or by requiring written
statements rather than live testimony-also have the potential to
influence case outcomes. Ideally, the limits merely force each par-
ty to focus its presentation in a way that is more convincing than
a longer presentation. Actually, the limits force the parties to
make predictions about the marginal value of evidence: Which
questions to which witnesses are most crucially important?
Which exhibits are key? What quantity of circumstantial evi-
dence is necessary to support a crucial inference? How many cor-
roborating witnesses are needed to avoid the appearance that a
difference in witness testimony is merely a credibility fight?
When are two experts better than one? If the omitted evidence
would have made no difference, then time limits have sped up the
trial without affecting the outcome. If, however, the omitted evi-
dence might have made a difference, then management has
222. Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an Impartial Jury:
Resolving the Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 732 (1985).
223. 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, § 47.10[3] [e] [ii] ("Many prospective jurors are more
candid when counsel questions them than when the court questions them. The judge sits
in an elevated position, wrapped in a robe representing authority and integrity. The judge
has introduced the prospective jurors to the case and has admonished them that they
must be fair and open minded. In these circumstances, it is very difficult for a person to
admit to the judge that he or she cannot be fair.").
224. One example arises out of the "tort reform" debate: should the parties be allowed
to question potential jurors about their exposure and reaction to tort reform advertising?
See generally Valerie P. Hans and William S. Lofquist, Perceptions of Civil Justice: The
Litigation Crisis Attitudes of Civil Jurors, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 181 (1994); Elizabeth Lof-
tus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A. J. 68 (1979); Gary Moran et al.,
Attitudes Toward Tort Reform, Scientific Jury Selection, and Juror Bias: Verdict Inclina-
tion in Criminal and Civil Trials, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 309 (1994).
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tipped the outcome. Although this could affect either party, it is
more likely to have an adverse effect on the party with the bur-
den of proof, the one whose role in the adversary process requires
the production of evidence-the one who loses when the evidence
is in equipoise.
Decisions to require evidence-direct witness testimony, expert
witness qualifications or basic testimony, or deposition summa-
ries-in the form of written narratives or summaries also has the
potential to disadvantage the party with the burden of proof. It is
no accident that novelists are advised to "show, don't tell"-let
the reader experience the story through the characters words, ac-
tions, and thoughts rather than the narrator's exposition and
summary.22 5 Live testimony in the witness's own words will often
be more vivid and more convincing than a narrative summary-
yet when the written statements are used, the witness is first
heard live on cross-examination. Written summaries of deposition
testimony provide no "voice" for the witness at all. The "bloodless"
trial resulting from extensive use of written summaries may save
time at the expense of a more holistic presentation to the fact
finder: "Here demeanor evidence-the array of sensory impres-
sions about a person that are available to the decider who ob-
serves the live in-court trial--could make a difference in a way
that matters . ,,226 A management decision made to save time
could again skew case outcomes to the detriment of the party who
would have benefited from the more vivid or extended evidence
format.
The choice of a granulated format for the jury charge has the
potential to affect outcomes in the same way as bifurcation. Some
impact can come from the order in which questions are presented.
One commentator urged defendants to try to take advantage of
this phenomenon: "When using a special-verdict form, pay careful
attention to the organization and number of the questions. A de-
225. JANET EVANOVICH, How I WRITE: SECRETS OF A BESTSELLING AUTHOR 45 (2006).
226. Marcus, supra note 3, at 763; see also id. at 762-70 (discussing differences in im-
pact of live and written testimony); CLMM, supra note 3, at 87 (pointing out that time
saved by use of deposition testimony in lieu of live witness should "be balanced against the
reasonable desire on the part of counsel to allow a key witness to 'speak the case' to the
jury"). It is also quite possible that the lawyers play a large role in the actual drafting of
the written testimony. And although lawyers will most always prepare friendly witnesses
in advance, letting the lawyer draft the written presentation goes a step further in making
that "spin" part of the record, and thus may actually change the information presented
from what a live question and answer colloquy would have revealed.
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fendant will want some of the earliest inquiries to be knockout
questions: if the jury can answer 'no' to the question, then it need
not proceed to any others."227 Empirical research supports this
lawyer intuition, finding that the order in which issues are pre-
sented to a jury can affect the outcome of the case.2 The other
kind of impact comes from separating related issues into distinct
questions, making it harder for the plaintiff to achieve the re-
quired unanimity and, like bifurcation, increasing the potential
for conflicting answers (and hence mistrial), and decreasing the
jurors' ability to assess the case in a holistic way.2s
The potential for case-altering impact exists. Some argue that
since the possibility of some rogue "activist" judge using the man-
agement tools purposely to change case outcomes is slim, we
should not let worries about the unlikely bad judge influence the
system.230 The risk that comes from unguided managerial discre-
tion, though, is broader than the possible existence of the occa-
sional venal or corrupt judge deliberately exercising biased dis-
cretion. Rather, the problem is that management decisions
present unacceptable and unreviewable variations based on indi-
vidual judges' feelings about the merits and importance of a
case-which are then balanced against the need for speed. These
decisions to trim procedural options are decisions about how
much time a particular case is worth-and the risk is not bad
faith, but the impact of each judge's own view of the substantive
law, professional experiences, life experiences, social values, po-
litical views, and subtle biases. These differing backgrounds also
result in different attitudes toward the very project of manage-
ment.23
1
227. Norman J. Wiener, Simple Lessons from a Complex Case, 12 LITIG. 14, 16 (1986).
228. Bordens, supra note 212, at 26 (analyzing the impact of different types of bifurca-
tion on juries).
229. See Thornburg, supra note 128, at 1885-89.
230. Cf. Mengler, supra note 5, at 465 ("Behind some of the demands for detailed pro-
cedural rules and less trial court discretion is the specter of an evil genius, the biased or
unprincipled trial judge. The pat, but nonetheless sound, response to these demands is
that procedural rules should not be drafted with the most incompetent or evil judge in
mind."). And as Mengler correctly notes, "[n]o rules, however detailed, can prevent unethi-
cal trial judges from treating litigants unfairly." Id.
231. See 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, § 16.04[b]. Indeed, some judges' backgrounds
may make them more likely to take more of a hands-off approach:
[Slome civil side litigators who become judges, especially if they have prac-
ticed for many years, simply do not agree with the view that it is appropriate
for judges to actively intervene in the litigation dynamic. Thus, some judges
reject, with varying levels of conviction, the fundamental assumptions on
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The lack of limits and ad hoc nature of managerial trial deci-
sions are especially troubling in light of our increasing under-
standing of the ways in which judges' own experiences with the
world affect their decisions. Judges are human beings with the
same mental equipment as other people. 2 Sometimes this hap-
pens simply because a judge, based on his life encounters with
the world, can summon knowledge from a context that is not so
familiar for judges who grew up in a different environment.
During the most recent term of the Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, Justice Ginsburg was able to help her male colleagues under-
stand the impact of a strip search on a thirteen-year-old girl sus-
pected of hiding Advil in her underwear. Consider the oral
argument in Safford Unified School District v. Redding.23
Justice Breyer thinking of his own experience as a boy, and
much amused, explained:
I'm trying to work out why is this a major thing to say strip down to
your underclothes, which children do when they change for gym ....
... [W]hen I was 8 or 10 or 12 years old, you know, we did take our
clothes off once a day; we changed for gym,..., okay? And in my ex-
perience, too, people did sometimes stick things in my underwear. 234
which the dominant current case management philosophy is based. These
judges believe in the traditional adversary system: giving the lawyers much
freer reign to run the case and in letting the chips fall where they may, and
limiting the court's role to enforcing procedural and evidentiary rules when a
party's demand creates a need for a ruling.
Id.
232. Some prefer to think of judges as umpires, disclaiming any personal component of
judging. Senator John Cornyn, commenting on the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor,
invoked this image: "The real question is how she views her role as a judge: whether it is
to advance causes or groups or whether it is to call balls and strikes." Bruce Weber, Um-
pires v. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at WK1. Actual umpires, however, understand
that even their job involves the application of discretion and search for the "spirit" of the
rules. Commenting on the supposedly fixed strike zone, one umpire said, "It's like the
Constitution .... The strike zone is a living, breathing document." Id. (quoting umpire
Gary Cedestrom).
233. 557 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
234. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-46, 58-59, Safford United Sch. Dist. v. Red-
ding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479) [hereinafter Oral Argument], available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argumenttranscripts/08-49.pdf (scroll to "2008 Term
Cases"; then follow "08-479" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). Justice Breyer's com-
ments were the source of great hilarity among the Justices and the spectators. See D.C.
Dicta, Breyer and the Case of the Funny Underwear, http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdic
ta/2009/04121/breyer-and-the-case-of-the-funny-underwear/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
1308 [Vol. 44:1261
THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE GOES TO TRIAL
Justice Ginsburg replied,
I don't think there's any dispute what was done in the case of both of
these girls. It wasn't just that they were stripped to their underwear.
They were asked to shake their bra out, to-to shake, stretch the top
of their pants and shake that out.
235
As Justice Ginsburg later explained to a reporter, "'They have
never been a 13-year-old girl. It's a very sensitive age for a girl. I
didn't think that my colleagues, some of them, quite unders-
tood .',,236
In the same kind of way, Justice Marshall was able to share
with his judicial colleagues an understanding of the way race and
racism impact society. When Marshall retired in 1991, Justice
O'Connor spoke of the ways in which she had learned from him
and of "the experience of listening to his stories during the decade
that they served together, stories that 'would, by and by, perhaps
change the way I see the world.' 237
This phenomenon is not limited to the rarified world of the Su-
preme Court. Social scientists have analyzed judicial reasoning
processes in various ways, and their results tend to show that
judges are subject to the same kinds of subtle biases as the rest of
us. For example, researchers tested 133 sitting trial judges and
found that, for the most part, the judges held the same kind of
implicit discriminatory biases that most adults hold.2 - Pat K.
Chew and Robert E. Kelley studied 400 workplace racial harass-
ment cases and found that
judges' race significantly affects outcomes in workplace racial ha-
rassment cases. African-American judges rule differently than White
judges, even when one takes into account their political affiliation or
certain characteristics of the case. Our findings further suggest that
235. Oral Argument, supra note 234, at 46.
236. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: The Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 6,
2009, at 1A.
237. Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed, Every Justice Creates a New Court, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2009, at A27 (quoting Justice O'Connor).
238. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195, 1205 (2009) ("We find that judges harbor the same
kinds of implicit biases as others; that these biases can influence their judgment; but that
given sufficient motivation, judges can compensate for the influence of these biases.").
This study used the implicit association test. Id. at 1209. Versions of this test are availa-
ble at Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). See
also Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (2007) (reporting on a study showing that trial judges rely on intuition in mak-
ing their decisions).
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judges of all races are attentive to relevant facts of the cases but may
reach different conclusions depending on their races.
239
Nor are issues of race and gender the only areas where a
judge's background can subtly influence the way a judge eva-
luates a case. In 2007 the Supreme Court decided a case in which
Victor Harris sued police officers after they ended a high-speed
chase by ramming his car (which resulted in Harris becoming,
quadriplegic). 240 The chase itself, from the perspective of some of
the police cars involved, had been captured on videotape.2 ' After
watching these videotapes, the Court ruled 8-1 that the tapes
demonstrated conclusively that Harris's flight posed a deadly risk
to the public.242 To "prove" their point, the majority posted the
video on the Court's website.243 But the Justices' confidence that
their viewpoint was universal was incorrect. Kahan, Hoffman,
and Braman showed the video to 1350 people with interesting re-
sults.244 "Whites and African Americans, high-wage earners and
low-wage earners, Northeasterners and Southerners and Wes-
terners, liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats-
all varied significantly in their perceptions of the risk that Harris
posed .... -245
What does all this have to do with managerial judging? The po-
tential impact is subtle, but nevertheless worrisome. A decision
about case management, including trial management, is not just
a time estimate. It is a weighing of the cost in time and expenses
that additional process would require against the value of giving
239. Pat K Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1117, 1156 (2009).
240. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374-76 (2007).
241. Id. at 378.
242. Id. at 372, 379-80, 386. Justice Stevens disagreed, and described the videotaped
chase in detail. He also reflected on the impact of experience:
I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by two or
three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or explosions,
but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming by in the opposite
lane. Had they learned to drive when most high-speed driving took place on
two-lane roads rather than on superhighways-when split-second judgments
about the risk of passing a slowpoke in the face of oncoming traffic were rou-
tine-they might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately.
Id. at 390 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5; Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REV. 837,
840-41 (2009).
244. See Kahan et al., supra note 243, at 841.
245. Id. at 903.
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the case that time. The "value" part of the analysis will reflect the
judge's assessment of the merits of the particular case and of how
important it is to society more generally for that type of contro-
versy to be litigated.2 46 Especially where no standards guide the
weighing process, subjective and subconscious value judgments
creep in, just as they did in the pretrial management hypothetical
posed to the judges at Yale twenty-five years ago.247
The inevitability of different judicial perspectives may be ex-
acerbated by the very politicized process that produces federal
judges. While district judgeships are not yet as carefully watched
as appointments to appellate courts, the deliberate consideration
of politics and attitudes has increasingly affected the process at
all levels.248 If Presidents and Senators succeed in choosing judges
with congenial attitudes-whether about particular substantive
claims (like civil rights cases or antitrust cases) or about the costs
of litigation-then the combination of politics, judicial attitude,
and the application of ad hoc managerial judging has the poten-
tial to systematically, rather than randomly, skew settlements
and trial outcomes, especially if a single political party dominates
judicial selection for a substantial period of time.249
E. No Meaningful Appellate Review
When considering pretrial management, the obstacles to secur-
ing appellate review are manifold. The pretrial orders are interlo-
cutory (and only occasionally reviewable as collateral orders, by
mandamus, or because a lawyer was willing to be held in con-
tempt to secure an appealable order).250 Substantial time may
pass between the entry of the order and an eventual appeal.
Some of the judge's management activity is not on the record and
246. Cf. Peterson, supra note 1, at 80 n.158 (reflecting on the ways in which various
biases could affect pretrial management decisions and citing federal race and gender bias
task force reports).
247. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
248. See generally KEVIN L. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 37-67 (1997); C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND
JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 24-57 (1996).
249. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et al., Right On: The Decision-Making Behavior of George
W. Bush's Judicial Appointees, 92 JUDICATURE 312, 312-13 (2009); Jennifer Segal Diascro
& Rorie Spill Solberg, George W. Bush's Legacy on the Federal Bench: Policy in the Face of
Diversity, 92 JUDICATURE 289, 289-90 (2009); Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush's Judicial
Legacy: Mission Accomplished, 92 JUDICATURE 258, 258, 260 (2009).
250. See 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, § 16.79.
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hence somewhat impervious to review. Some of the judge's man-
agement suggestions are agreed to by the parties, in an effort to
avoid antagonizing a decisionmaker who will continue to wield
substantial discretionary power over the development of the case.
If the managerial judge succeeds in convincing the parties to set-
tle, there will be no appeal where a review could otherwise hap-
pen.251 Even without a settlement, review and reversals will be
rare."2
At first blush, one might expect trial-stage management to es-
cape this particular critique. After all, when a case goes to trial it
often is not going to settle (so that insulation goes away), the trial
will result in a final, appealable judgment, and the appellate
court can go to work.253 For pretrial decisions shaping the trial,
though, the unhappy litigant will still have to wait until after the
trial is over to assert an appellate complaint. 254 Aside from the
timing difference, however, the same factors that declaw appel-
late review of pretrial management do the same for trial-stage
decisions. 2"1 Both share the double hurdle of a deferential stan-
dard of review and the difficulty of showing harmful error.
The "abuse of discretion" standard of review governs all of
these decisions:
" decisions to consolidate or bifurcate; 256
* decisions granting or denying continuances; 257
* decisions imposing time limits, including limits on open-
ing statements and closing arguments; 258
* decisions limiting the number of witnesses or exhibits; 59
251. "[Wjhen such judicial efforts succeed, they guarantee that appellate courts will
play no role in the suit: neither the settlement itself nor any preceding judicial ruling will
be appealable." Yeazell, supra note 156, at 656.
252. See id. at 651-52.
253. Those that do settle in the immediate pretrial period, or even during trial, are as
fully insulated from review as those that settle earlier in the process. See id. at 659.
254. See 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, § 16.79[1] (noting that pretrial orders are not
final and not generally appealable as collateral orders).
255. "Many matters of pretrial process... are reviewed, when they are reviewed at all,
under the 'abuse of discretion' standard. As a result trial courts exercise essentially final
power on such matters even when the trial decision is appealable." See Yeazell, supra note
156, at 665.
256. 8 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, § 42.10[2][a] (discussing consolidation); id. §
42.20[5][b].
257. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, § 2352.
258. See, e.g., Grey v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 393 F.2d 371, 386 (5th Cir. 1968).
259. See, e.g., MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983).
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* decisions about voir dire;20
* decisions about challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges; 261
* decisions about the order of proceeding;262
* decisions about the format of evidence; 261
* decisions about admitting or excluding relevant evi-
dence;264 and
* decisions about the jury charge format.265
The very deferential nature of this review can be glimpsed in
the articulation of the test in cases that specifically challenge
scheduling decisions. For example, when the appellant challenges
the trial court's enforcement or modification of its pretrial sche-
duling order, there is no abuse of discretion unless "no reasonable
person could take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasona-
ble persons could differ, no abuse of discretion can be found."266
The same is true for any challenge to a scheduling decision-an
abuse of discretion will only be found where no reasonable person
could agree with the trial judge .26 Reviews of trial limits on time
and witnesses are affirmed unless "the manner of the presenta-
tion of information to a jury is judicially restricted to the extent
that the information becomes incomprehensible .... -268 It is no
260. See, e.g., Kanekoa v. City and County of Honolulu, 879 F.2d 607, 614 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding abuse of discretion only when questions are sufficient to test for bias or par-
tiality); Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying abuse of dis-
cretion standard to voir dire challenge).
261. Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 624-25 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing
standard of review for trial court's decision regarding challenge for cause); Smith v.
Pressed Steel Tank Co., 66 F.R.D. 429, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (discussing standard of review
for trial court's decision regarding peremptory challenges).
262. Sec'y of Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 794 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[The judge] may de-
termine generally the order in which parties will adduce proof; his determination will be
reviewed only for abuse of discretion." (quoting Greders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86
(1976))).
263. See Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting standard of review for bankruptcy's pretrial order regarding written testimony).
264. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 125
(1985).
265. Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 845-46 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that jury
instructions must be read as a whole and reviewed for abuse of district court's broad dis-
cretion); see 9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, § 2556. In fact, so long as the charge is
reasonably accurate legally, the format is not reviewable at all.
266. Gorlikowski v. Tolbert, 52 F.3d 1439, 1444 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Durr v. Inter-
county Title Co. of Ill., 14 F.3d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1994)).
267. See, e.g., Arthur Pierson & Co. v. Provimi Veal Corp., 887 F.2d 837, 838-39 (7th
Cir. 1989).
268. Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849-50 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding an
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surprise that the entire chapter on Rule 16 in Wright & Miller's
Federal Practice and Procedure appears to cite no cases in which
a trial court was found to have abused its discretion in making a
trial management decision,26 9 or that the Rule 16 coverage in
Moore's Federal Practice apparently cites only two cases in which
an issue related to the trial court's pretrial order was reversed as
an abuse of discretion.2 70 Indications are that no cited cases re-
versed a trial court based on time limits, witness limits, written
testimony requirements, or decisions about the order of proceed-
ings.27
Even if the abuse of discretion standard were not so forgiving,
appellants complaining about the denial of procedural opportuni-
ties face a significant hurdle in the harmless error rule.272 Recent
cases indicate that Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure requires reversal only when "it is 'highly probable' that the
error affected the party's rights, that the error 'affected a party's
right to a fair trial to a substantial degree,' [or] that the verdict
'more probably than not' was tainted."27 1 Often, because they are
complaining about things they were not allowed to do, appellants
are in a position of asking the court of appeals to speculate both
about what greater opportunity would have allowed and about
the impact of that information.
Tied to this issue is the problem of preserving error. For exam-
ple, three federal appellate panels have criticized the use of time
limits, but found that the appellant had not preserved error.
While exclusion of a concrete piece of evidence can be preserved
for review by making an offer of proof, the impact of the court's
decision to allow only a certain number of hours or a certain
abuse of discretion for a combination of limiting orders, but affirming decision below be-
cause error was harmless).
269. See 6A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 75, §§ 1521-1531.
270. 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, §§ 16.77 n.45, 16.90 n.27, 16.92 n.75. The decisions
relate to the propriety of allowing testimony of witnesses not listed in the pretrial order
and amending judgment based on a theory not included among the prevailing party's con-
tentions witnesses rather than the provisions of the order itself. See Bradley v. United
States, 866 F.2d 120, 124-27 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Circle,
652 F.2d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1981).
271. 3 MOORE ETAL., supra note 9, §§ 16.77 n.45, 16.90 n.27, 16.92 n.75.
272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61.
273. 12 MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, § 61.02[3] (quoting McQueeney v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928 (3d Cir. 1985); Smith v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 778 F.2d
384, 389 (7th Cir. 1985); Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.
1983)).
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number of witnesses is more difficult to document.24 Even if more
time is belatedly offered, that opportunity may come too late. 7
Similarly, the prejudice alleged to result from bifurcation or tri-
furcation of trial has been resistant to a showing of harm, even
when the court is concerned about the potential impact of a first
trial phase that excludes the human plaintiffs from the jury's
sight and precludes testimony about their damages.276
In summary, although the proximity of trial to appeal makes
the final judgment rule slightly less of an obstacle to judicial re-
view of trial-stage managerial judging, the deferential abuse of
discretion standard and the difficulty in demonstrating harm
from the managerial rulings mean that trial management, like
pretrial management, is effectively final in the trial court in the
vast majority of cases.
F. A New Problem: Loss of Party Participation, Control, and
Confidence
In the pretrial phase of civil litigation, there are few opportuni-
ties for direct party participation. While ethics rules leave ulti-
mate control in the hands of the parties, attorneys are the prima-
ry actors and even have discretion to make various procedural
choices.2 77 The parties may testify by deposition, and may partici-
pate in mediation, but on the whole the pretrial period is not the
274. See McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming
because GM had only requested thirty additional minutes and had not demonstrated what
it would have done with the additional time); Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678-79 (8th
Cir. 1987) (affirming because there was no offer of proof before the close of evidence); Fla-
minio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming because "the plaintiffs
have failed to indicate what evidence they would have put in, or cross-examination they
would have conducted, if they had had more time"). And if counsel were required to make
offers of proof in question-and-answer format for any uncalled witness or unasked ques-
tion, the time saved in imposing the limits in the first place would disappear.
275. As Longan points out, a decision at the end of a party's case comes too late to help
a party who has trimmed time from a strong opening witness is not helpful.
A lawyer who wants to finish strong but still meet his limit will leave out the
less persuasive evidence first. If, as he approaches the climax of the trial he
learns that he has the option to add more evidence, he will have to finish in a
weaker manner or forego the opportunity. The court's kindness in being flex-
ible is no blessing.
Longan, supra note 109, at 716.
276. Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (In re Bendectin Litigation), 857 F.2d 290,
294, 315-16 (6th Cir. 1988); Kiser v. Bryant Elec. (In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation), 695
F.2d 207, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1982).
277. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.4(a)(2) (2009).
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time when litigants personally experience the benefits of process.
Probably for this reason, prior critique of pretrial management
did not touch extensively on the impact of management tech-
niques on the parties' satisfaction with the process.
At the trial stage, however, these concerns come to the fore.
Quite apart from the impact of management decisions on the me-
rits, the managed trial has the potential to decrease significantly
the litigants' perception of fairness.7 8 Researchers have identified
four components of procedural justice: (1) voice, (2) neutrality, (3)
respectful treatment, and (4) trustworthy authorities .279 "Voice"
requires that parties be allowed to participate in the proceedings,
express their viewpoints, and tell their stories. 20 "Neutrality" re-
quires consistently applied legal principles, unbiased decision
makers, and transparent decisions. 281 "Respect" requires that par-
ties be treated with dignity, politeness, and respect for their
rights.28 2 And "trustworthy" authorities are those who listen care-
fully to the parties and explain their decisions.2 83 In order to try to
assure themselves that these values will be respected, litigants
tend to prefer procedures in which they retain control over the
process. 2 4
Trial management can harm the parties' perceptions of fair-
ness in a number of ways. The most obvious is loss of voice. When
a party is required to draft a written statement in advance (prob-
ably with a lot of lawyer input), and gets to "speak" to the trier of
fact only when being cross-examined, the experience of telling
one's own story and confronting opposing parties will be severely
diminished. Less dramatically, time limits or limits on number of
witnesses that deprive parties of the opportunity to present in-
formation that they believe to be important also decrease the liti-
gants' sense of voice. Bruce Winick has suggested that even be-
278. See generally Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dis-
pute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41
CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181
(2004); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 103 (1988).
279. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 887 (1997).
280. Id. at 887-88.
281. See id. at 892.
282. Id. at 891.
283. Id. at 889.
284. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 566
(1978).
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tween client and lawyer, the client's need for "voice" extends to
the content of opening statement and closing argument.2 15 Con-
sider how much stronger the loss would be when the control
comes not from the party's own lawyer, but from the judge.
The neutrality principle is also threatened by extensive man-
agement. As explained above, managerial judging does not turn
on legal principles, is not consistently applied, and is not at all
transparent. This combination means that a party's litigation ex-
perience is dependent on the idiosyncratic perspectives of indi-
vidual judges, undermining the confidence that the system pro-
vides equal process for all. Even though the parties to a single
lawsuit will probably receive similar limits, those limits will not
affect them the same way.2 6 Moreover, similar lawsuits will re-
ceive different treatment because of different judges' different as-
sessments of the managerial needs of the cases.
The "trustworthiness" principle overlaps with voice and neu-
trality. The loss of voice will detract from the litigant's feeling
that she was listened to; the loss of explanation and transparency
will also decrease a feeling of trust. In addition, concerns that the
judge's deep participation in the development of the case will re-
sult in biases about the parties, the lawyers, and the dispute are
reasons to fear that certain kinds of management can compro-
mise the trustworthiness principle and, by extension, the parties'
confidence in the judicial system.
Managing a trial is not likely to lead to disrespectful treatment
of individual litigants in the sense that a judge will be verbally
rude or insulting. Nevertheless, techniques that decrease the par-
ty's participation-such as limits on testimony and bifurcation
that remove or delay the plaintiffs' accounts of their expe-
riences-may be perceived as disrespectful in that they are based
on a judicial decision that the excluded information is not worthy
or is in some way suspect. Some judges might even communicate
the feeling that the right the party is asserting is comparatively
unimportant.
Consider the perspective of the parties in the workplace ha-
rassment case, Sims v. ANR Freight System, Inc.287 Although all
285. Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37
CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 118-19 (2000).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 214-26.
287. 77 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 1996).
2010]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
parties agreed the case would take five to seven days to try, the
judge allowed each side five minutes for opening statements, and
two-and-a-half hours for the presentation of evidence (the plain-
tiffs time was divided between two hours for her case-in-chief
and thirty minutes for rebuttal).288 The judge determined the or-
der in which Sims could present her witnesses.289 In addition, he
"repeatedly limited both direct and cross examination, frequently
ordering counsel to 'move on,' and continually reminded counsel
of the time limits." 290 The judge also refused to allow the parties to
read stipulated facts to the jury (although the judge had required
the parties to make the stipulations).29' It is unlikely that this
treatment appeared to any of the parties to be respectful.
Nor was the plaintiff likely to feel that the appellate process
corrected the deficiencies in her treatment by the trial court. The
Fifth Circuit commended the trial judge for attempting to man-
age a large docket and praised management generally. 292 As to
Sims's case specifically, the appellate panel found that "the me-
thodology imposed on this trial by the court and the restrictions
that were placed on the lawyers regarding the manner of the
presentation of evidence adversely impacted on the comprehensi-
bility of the evidence to the point that Sims was denied a trial"-
but it refused to remand for a new trial. 293 Without any explana-
tion, or any analysis of the difference between a three-day pres-
entation and a two-hour presentation, the court found the error
harmless: "The evidence is so overwhelming against Sims that
there is 'no reasonable possibility that the outcome would be dif-
ferent if the case were re-tried, even if Sims were allowed to
present fully all her evidence in a comprehensible manner.29 4
The managerial trial by definition involves a loss of litigant
control. Important decisions about the structure of the trial, the
composition of the jury, the nature and quantity of evidence to be
presented to the judge or jury, the order of presentation, and the
288. Id. at 848. In response to the court's requirement that the parties file detailed lists
of facts they intended to prove at trial, Sims had listed 640 facts from 18 witnesses to be
proved for her tort claim and 1510 facts to be proved through 27 witnesses for her Title
VII claim. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 849.
294. Id.
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ultimate questions to be asked all shift from the parties (and
their lawyers) to the trial judge. Even if one is convinced that the
judge's managerial decisions are empirically superior to those
that the lawyers would have made, the loss of control is itself a
significant change in the quality of the process.
V. MANAGING THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE
Judicial management, used properly, can improve both process
and results in individual cases, but both systemically and in spe-
cific situations it poses serious problems. Managerial ideology is
here to stay, but it needs to be more thoughtfully cabined and its
use more restrained. As with pretrial management, the challenge
for critics of the system is to suggest what to do about manage-
ment's downside.
Identifying the systematic weaknesses in pretrial management
did not lead to its demise, or even slow its pace. Pretrial man-
agement is more firmly entrenched now than it was in the
1980s. 295 Many developments after Resnik's article institutiona-
lized and even required management techniques. Each successive
amendment to Rule 16 has expanded the management power.29 6
In addition, the Civil Justice Reform Act required each district to
consider adopting local rules to bolster litigation management
and to encourage ADR and settlement.297 The local rules of many
district courts incorporate the structures of managerial judging.29
Yet in subtle ways the institutionalization has provided a de-
gree of standardization. For example, changes in the discovery
295. See Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,
J.) ("The rise of the 'pro-active' judge, the search for cheap and fast substitutes for the
conventional Anglo-American trial, the convergence of the American and Continental sys-
tems-all these developments are well under way and are probably irreversible." (citing
John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 858-66
(1995); Resnik, supra note 1, at 386)).
296. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983 & 1993 amends.). The
1993 amendments in particular explicitly expanded control over trial management. See id.
297. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5091
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 473 (2006)). Sophisticated clients, more aware that
lawyers were making procedural choices that increased the cost of litigation, also began to
more aggressively manage the lawyers, putting them on budgets and prohibiting certain
kinds of expensive litigation behavior. Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 198 (2001) (discussing insurance company constraints on defense
budgets).
298. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 43-1, supra note 99 (expressly allowing judge to order direct
testimony to be presented by written narrative statement in lieu of live testimony).
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rules have introduced standard numerical limits on some discov-
ery devices, made automatic initial disclosures mandatory, and
made pretrial disclosures of experts, fact witnesses, and exhibits
mandatory. 99 They have also made an early discovery conference
mandatory and specified its timing.300 Changes in Rule 16 itself
have brought greater uniformity in terms of the flow of manage-
ment, requiring and specifying the timing for the initial pretrial
conference and the content of the scheduling order, and mandat-
ing an order reciting the action taken at any conference °.30 Never-
theless, pretrial management remains highly discretionary, gen-
erally immune from review, and irreversible.
Would trial-stage management be any more susceptible to reg-
ulation? It might be in theory, but the political realities of courts
and rulemakers make significant changes improbable. While en-
hanced appeal, specific rulemaking, and enforced transparency
could be attempted, each comes with its own costs that are un-
likely to outweigh the current enthusiasm for judicial manage-
ment.
The creation of a more effective system of appellate review is
the normal method by which the system itself imposes more con-
trol on trial courts. In order to provide for meaningful appellate
review, we could create an exception to the final judgment rule,302
adopt a standard of review with teeth, and relax the application
of the harmless error rule.30 3 The challenge would be to do so
299. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1993 amend.), 30(a)(2) (1993 amend.), 33(a) (1993
amend.).
300. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (1993 amend.).
301. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (1993 amend.), 16(d) (2006 amend.).
302. Since the number of federal civil cases that actually go to trial is relatively small,
and since the subset of those cases that involve significant management orders is even
smaller, more immediate and less deferential appeals would not risk the same kind of
burden on appellate courts as would interlocutory appeal of pretrial orders. For a discus-
sion of the issues raised by interlocutory appeals, see generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 44 Sw. L.J. 1045
(1990) (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of interlocutory review). However,
the disruptive nature of appeals immediately before trial militates against this change.
303. The standard for reversal could ratchet all the way up to de novo review, but that
is not the only option. Consider, for example, the New York standard of review of damage
judgments at issue in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. (i.e., does the decision in
this case deviate materially from other similar cases?), which could be a check on inter-
judge consistency. 518 U.S. 415, 418 (1996). Nor does a change in the test for harm require
that harm be presumed. See, e.g,, Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex. 1965)
(holding that harm from improper allocation of peremptory challenges should be deter-
mined by looking at whether the trial was "materially unfair," based on an examination of
the entire record to see whether the trial was hotly contested and the evidence sharply
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without creating a system in which appeals would disrupt trials,
clog the appellate court system, force appellate courts to immerse
themselves in the factual details of trial plans, and require re-
trials that would add to trial court dockets.30 4 In addition, appel-
late courts might be reluctant to add to their workloads to under-
take a review of this type of decision, and might doubt that the
resulting cases would provide sufficient general guidance to be
worth the time and effort required.305
Another way to confine trial-management discretion would be
to draft rules that limit managerial discretion.0 6 Some more re-
cent federal rule amendments do take a more directive approach
and take some of the discretion away from previously unregu-
lated orders.37 Certain practices-such as the use of written di-
rect testimony in jury trials-could be prohibited. Other orders-
such as those involving certain kinds of bifurcation, orders that
require evidence to be summarized rather than presented, and
orders that provide insufficient time to communicate clearly-
might also be candidates for prohibition or severe limits. Howev-
er, the process of drafting such rules would involve the same
kinds of politicized jockeying for procedural advantage that we
have observed in recent proposals to amend the rules.30 8 In addi-
tion, rules that limit judicial discretion are likely to be opposed by
the judges themselves. They have fought recent attempts to
amend the rules even in moderate ways when their discretion
would be limited-as when they prevented amendments that
would have restored the twelve-member jury3 9 and that would
have mandated the attorney's right to participate in jury selec-
conflicting) (citing Cloudt v. Hutcherson, 175 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)).
304. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 433.
305. See generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency,
and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273
(1996).
306. Resnik, supra note 1, at 433.
307. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (2003 amend.); FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's
notes (2003 amend.).
308. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the
1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 260 (1999); see also Paul D. Carrington,
Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 306-
07, 308 (1994) (noting opposition to automatic disclosure rule from products liability de-
fense interests); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Perva-
sive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1393, 1400-24 (1994) (tracing sources and history of groups urging curtailment of discov-
ery).
309. See Marcia Coyle, Civil Juries Won't Go Back to 12 Seats, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30,
1996, at A16.
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tion.310 It thus seems unlikely that any significant limitations on
managerial trials would result from the rulemaking process un-
less judicial attitudes change dramatically.
The problems of arbitrariness and lack of consistency might be
alleviated by a requirement that trial courts provide reasons for
their managerial orders and publish those decisions, in hopes
that a coherent body of cases might result.3 ' One way to make a
skill-based discretionary decision depend on something beyond
"trust us, we know what we're doing," is to require the judges to
explicitly exercise that skill by providing a convincing explana-
tion of their decisions. 312 Unfortunately for either this plan or ap-
peals, each explanation could be so extremely fact-specific that it
would require a very large body of cases before one could begin to
see any trends.3 13 In addition, the orders themselves would fail to
provide information on how well or how badly the trial plan
worked, nor would they provide any way to determine whether
trial under a different plan, or an "unmanaged" trial, would have
taken more time or resulted in a different judgment.
The least controlling, but possibly most feasible, alternative is
to revise the official training given to trial judges, such as judicial
seminars and the CLMM, so that they provide less cheerleading
and more guidance with regard to trial management. For exam-
ple, in the CLMM's current form, it helpfully suggests a wide
menu of management options.3 14 It does not, however, provide
meaningful advice about how to decide what, if any, tools to use,
how to determine the limits imposed, or when not to take the de-
cision away from the parties and their lawyers.3 15 Training should
310. See Marcia Coyle, Rules Would Expend Voir Dire, Civil Jury Size, NATL L.J., Mar.
11, 1996, at A12.
311. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(6) ("An order imposing a sanction must describe the sanc-
tioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction."); Peterson, supra note 1, at 92-105
(setting forth plan to control discretion by referring managerial issues to magistrates and
having district judges review their decisions through written decisions creating and ex-
plaining the relevant standards).
312. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning
from the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manu-
script at 13-14, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427489) (detailing benefits of re-
quiring trial judges to explain their sentencing decisions).
313. Since trial judges rely on a "discretion as skill" paradigm, explanations would like-
ly cite the specifics of the case rather than any kind of legal rule justifying the decisions
structuring trial. See Yablon, supra note 170, at 263-64.
314. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
315. See id.; see also Longan, supra note 109, at 709 (explaining judges should only im-
pose time limits on trials that last more than four days, as the time required to formulate
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also sensitize judges to the ways in which their decisions can be
subtly affected by their inherent biases, professional experiences,
and politics. There is some reason to believe that such efforts
could be beneficial; some of the same studies that identify the ex-
istence of such biases also indicate that judges may be able to
counteract their own biases when the issue is explicitly raised.316
For any of the options, the existence of high-quality empirical
research would be crucial. "Trust us" is not an adequate basis for
a pervasive feature of the judicial system, and both claims of effi-
ciency and fears of arbitrariness would be more convincing if they
rested on an evidentiary foundation. In the largest sense, mana-
gerial decisions are supported by an argument that the benefits
of management outweigh any disadvantages that might come
along for the ride. This is essentially an empirical claim that judi-
cially managed trials (1) take less judicial time than attorney-
managed trials, (2) save time that is used to benefit other users of
the court system, (3) save the litigants time and money, and (4)
accomplish all these goals without affecting substantive outcomes
or warping settlement leverage. If this is not the case-if, for ex-
ample, the time needed to manage exceeds the time saved, if the
frontloading of attorney time required to comply with manage-
ment orders generates costs that exceed costs avoided, if man-
agement decisions are affecting settlements and verdicts-then
the rules should change accordingly.
Other types of research would also be helpful. At the level of
individual management devices, research showing the compara-
tive costs and benefits of particular management techniques
could aid both judges and rulemakers in decisions about the use
and abuse of managerial orders. Researchers could also examine
whether the implementation of managerial discretion is signifi-
cantly inconsistent among different judges so that the lack of
standards is in fact a cause for concern.3 17 Research should also
include empirical studies of the impact of various management
techniques on the parties' perceptions of process fairness.
careful limits would exceed the time saving at trial).
316. Rachlinski et al., supra note 238, at 1223-25.
317. Cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudica-
tion, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 302 (2007) (analyzing empirical study concluding that identity
of assigned judge or asylum officer was single most important variable in whether asylum
applications were granted).
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For those who question whether trial judges, individually or
collectively, are striking the right balance, there is little recourse.
We are left with the hope that the judiciary will police itself and
supply internally the practice, skill, and values needed to exercise
restraint in managing lawyers and cases, and that they will
somehow supply the consistency, self-restraint, and self-
awareness that the rules themselves lack.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence that govern trials are consistent with the rules that go-
vern pretrial proceedings. They are designed to create wide lee-
way to try the issues made possible by the broad rules of pleading
and joinder. Just as in the case of pretrial management, trial
management is a pushback against the flexibility and inclusive-
ness of the procedure and evidence rules. 31s Judges can and do
impose the same kind of "less is more and settlement is best" phi-
losophy on trials that they have imposed on the pretrial stage of
litigation. And as was true for the pretrial phase, the trimming is
governed not by the substantive law, but by an unguided desire
for efficiency.
Managing trial, like managing pretrial, is not all bad. In an
ideal world, "[w]orking together, the court and counsel can ensure
that the trial will be as streamlined, focused, and efficient as
possible, thus maximizing the likelihood of a fair result and mi-
nimizing the burdens imposed on jurors and witnesses." 319 Unfor-
tunately, we do not live in that perfect world. Management,
spread over hundreds of judges and thousands of cases, threatens
important procedural values. With its single-minded focus on
speed and efficiency, it can ignore the countervailing importance
that the system be "just."
The downside of managerial judging threatens both distribu-
tive and procedural justice. Its lack of standards allows an incon-
sistency that affects outcomes and neutrality. Its lack of transpa-
rency deters the development of standards, prevents the
monitoring of impact, and undermines the trustworthiness of the
judiciary. Its muffling of party voice and removal of party control
318. Cf. Elliott, supra note 1, at 310 (commenting on pretrial management).
319. 3 MOORE ETAL.,SUpra 9, § 16.77[1].
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can distort verdicts and settlements and weaken confidence in
the court system. Its deference to the judge's individual view of
the resources a case deserves allows unarticulated and potential-
ly biased value judgments to creep into facially quantitative deci-
sions. Its lack of effective review eliminates the kinds of checks
on discretion that can improve outcome accuracy and bolster a
sense of fairness.
The breadth of uncontrolled discretion allowed by managed tri-
als can strike at the heart of the most basic assumptions of our
procedural system-that judicial decisions should be reasoned
and explained rather than arbitrary and conclusory; that party
autonomy and participation are important to the adversary
process; that rules should be consistently applied; and that pro-
cedural rulings should minimize their effect on party advantage
and case outcomes. Far from overcoming the discretionary ex-
cesses of pretrial management, managerial trials exacerbate
them. Switching from pretrial to trial is not the answer; the
courts' distrust of party control and their automatic resort to
judicial management have invaded the trial phase as well. Unfor-
tunately, only a significant change in judicial attitudes toward
the value and importance of judges' own processes is likely to
slow the management tsunami and ensure that the court sys-
tem's desire for justice is not swamped by an ocean of cost control.
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